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INTRODUCTION 
In 2009, the Supreme Court handed down several important decisions on 
criminal procedure.
1
  Perhaps unanticipated at the time, two of those 
decisions have been read together by lower courts to reach dramatically 
                                                 
 1. See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009) (holding 
that under the Sixth Amendment, laboratory test results are testimonial in nature, and in 
order for the results to be admissible into evidence, the analysts who generated them must 
testify in court); Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2091–92 (2009) (overruling 
Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986), to hold that a waiver of the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel is possible if the waiver is knowing and intelligent); Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. 
Ct. 1710, 1723 (2009) (holding that “[p]olice may search a vehicle incident to a recent 
occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger 
compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains 
evidence of the offense of arrest”); Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 704 (2009) 
(expanding the scope of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule to encompass 
situations where an unlawful search is the result of isolated police negligence). 
OKLEWICZ_OFF_TO_PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 9/3/2010  10:47 AM 
2010] EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF THE GOOD-FAITH EXCEPTION 1717 
different results.
2
  The emerging split has been sharp, bringing with it 
urgent calls for the Court to intervene.
3
 
Laying the foundation for the conflicting decisions was %ew York v. 
Belton,
4
 in which the Supreme Court held that “when a policeman has 
made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as 
a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger 
compartment of the automobile” along with any containers found therein.
5
  
Following that decision, lower courts regularly upheld warrantless searches 
of vehicles conducted incident to an arrest after the police had secured the 
arrestee away from the target vehicle.
6
  In 2009, the United States Supreme 
Court, in Arizona v. Gant,
7
 found that these procedures did not comply with 
the rationale underlying Belton and declined to adopt the lower courts’ 
broad interpretations of that decision.
8
 
                                                 
 2. Compare United States v. Gonzalez, 578 F.3d 1130, 1132–33 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(holding that the good-faith exception does not apply to reliance on settled case law that is 
subsequently ruled unconstitutional while a conviction is on direct appeal), with United 
States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1044 (10th Cir. 2009) (applying Herring to find that the 
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule extends to an officer’s reasonable reliance on 
settled case law), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1686 (2010) 
 3. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at i, McCane v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1686 (2010) 
(No. 09-402) (requesting that the Supreme Court grant certiorari on the question of 
“[w]hether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to a search authorized 
by precedent at the time of the search that is subsequently ruled unconstitutional”). 
 4. 453 U.S. 454 (1981). 
 5. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460. 
 6. See, e.g., United States v. Weaver, 433 F.3d 1104, 1106 (9th Cir. 2006) (applying 
the Belton rule and upholding a warrantless search of an automobile incident to arrest); 
United States v. Barnes, 374 F.3d 601, 605 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that a warrantless search 
incident to arrest of a vehicle is permissible when the arrestee is handcuffed and secured 
away from the vehicle); United States v. Wesley, 293 F.3d 541, 549 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“[W]e 
read Belton as creating a bright-line rule that, incident to . . . arrest of the occupant of a 
vehicle, the police may search the passenger compartment of the vehicle without regard to 
whether the occupant was removed and secured at the time of the search.”); United States v. 
Humphrey, 208 F.3d 1190, 1202 (10th Cir. 2000) (upholding a search incident to arrest 
where the arrestee was handcuffed in the arresting officer’s patrol car at the time of the 
search); United States v. Doward, 41 F.3d 789, 793 (1st Cir. 1994) (validating a warrantless 
search of an automobile incident to arrest after the arrestee had been handcuffed and secured 
in the police officer’s vehicle); United States v. White, 871 F.2d 41, 44 (6th Cir. 1993) 
(holding that a warrantless search of the defendant’s car was permissible incident to arrest 
even when the defendant was locked in the police vehicle). 
 7. 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009). 
 8. Id. at 1719. The Belton decision was premised on the earlier case of Chimel v. 
California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), which allowed police to conduct warrantless searches 
incident to arrest of “the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon 
or evidentiary ite[m].”  Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763.  The Gant majority declared that the lower 
courts’ broad interpretation of Belton ignored this crucial link.  Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719.  
The Court held that searches of a vehicle incident to arrest are limited to situations where 
either the arrestee is “within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of 
the search” or the arresting officer has a reasonable belief that evidence related to the crime 
of arrest will be found within the vehicle.  Id. at 1723–24 (Scalia, J., concurring).  The Gant 
majority emphasized that it did not expressly overrule Belton, but that the decision had the 
practical effect of invalidating the lower courts’ interpretation of that case.  See Gant, 129 S. 
Ct. at 1722 n.9 (asserting that contrary to the dissent’s accusations, the Court’s decision 
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At the time the Supreme Court decided Gant, a number of cases were 
pending on direct review before lower courts based on evidence obtained in 
compliance with each jurisdiction’s understanding of the Belton rule.
9
  
Because Gant did not require lower courts to mechanically suppress 
evidence obtained in reliance on pre-Gant precedent,
10
 prosecutors 
searched for alternative justifications to uphold the admissibility of 
evidence collected according to these methods.
11
  They were able to find 
the support for their position in Herring v. United States,
12
 a decision 
handed down by the Supreme Court three months before Gant, which 
significantly enlarged the scope of the good-faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule.
13
 
In Herring, the Supreme Court held that exclusion is an inappropriate 
remedy for Fourth Amendment violations caused by the objectively 
reasonable actions of law enforcement employees.
14
  Government lawyers 
quickly deployed this new weapon in their battles against suppression 
where police officers obtained incriminating evidence in accordance with 
pre-Gant precedent.
15
  Faithfully following the Herring court’s decree that 
                                                                                                                 
merely demonstrated a “narrow reading,” rather than an overruling, of Belton); United 
States v. Grote, 629 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1206 n.8 (E.D. Wash. 2009) (observing that Gant 
effectively changes how Belton is interpreted). 
 9. See, e.g., United States v. Gray, No. 4:09CR3089, 2009 WL 4739740, at *1 (D. 
Neb. Dec. 7, 2009) (determining whether to apply the good-faith exception to a search 
conducted pursuant to valid case law at the time of the search later rendered unconstitutional 
by the decision in Gant); United States v. McGhee, 672 F. Supp. 2d 804, 811 (S.D. Ohio 
2009) (analyzing the claim by a defendant that the search of his automobile incident to 
arrest violated the Constitution even though, at the time of the search, the police officers 
were relying on valid precedent); Grote, 629 F. Supp. 2d at 1206 (discussing whether to 
suppress evidence obtained in reliance on precedent that was invalidated by Gant before 
trial). 
 10. See United States v. Lee, No. 07-04050-01-CR-C-NKL, 2009 WL 3762404, at *2 
(W.D. Mo. Nov. 10, 2009) (“Gant did not require suppression of evidence from a search . . . 
supported by pre-Gant precedent . . . .”). 
 11. See United States v. Peoples, 668 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1044 (W.D. Mich. 2009) 
(noting that while the government conceded that the search failed the Gant standard, it 
argued that the search was nonetheless valid because the police relied on pre-Gant law in 
good faith). 
 12. 129 S. Ct. 695, 704 (2009). 
 13. See United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1043–45 (10th Cir. 2009) (explaining 
that Herring’s rationale supports the conclusion that a law enforcement officer’s reasonable 
reliance on the settled case law of a jurisdiction constitutes an exception to the exclusionary 
rule), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1686 (2010); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Moving to the 
Right, Perhaps Sharply to the Right, 12 GREEN BAG 2D 413, 417 (2009) (“[In Herring] the 
Court issued a sweeping rule that the exclusionary rule never applies if the police violate the 
Fourth Amendment in good faith or through negligence.”). 
 14. Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 416. 
 15. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 578 F.3d 1130, 1132 (9th Cir. 2009) (arguing 
that although the search violated Gant, the evidence obtained should be admitted pursuant to 
the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule); Peoples, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 1045–46 
(contending that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule justifies admission of the 
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Allison, 637 F. 
Supp. 2d 657, 669–70 (S.D. Iowa 2009) (arguing that the good-faith exception allows for 
unlawfully obtained evidence to be admitted at trial when a police officer obtains the 
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the exclusionary rule should be used only as a “last resort,”
16
 government 
advocates successfully argued that the good-faith exception should be 
extended to include a law enforcement officer’s reasonable reliance on the 
settled case law of a jurisdiction that is subsequently invalidated.
17
  Such 
rulings, however, have given rise to a growing conflict among authorities, 
resulting in the disparate treatment of similarly situated defendants.
18
 
This Comment will argue that courts should continue to expand the 
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule to include a law enforcement 
officer’s reasonable reliance on the settled case law of the jurisdiction that 
is subsequently ruled unconstitutional.  Such a ruling would be consistent 
with the Supreme Court’s previous decisions addressing the good-faith 
exception, and logically follows from their rationale.
19
  Furthermore, 
expanding the scope of the exception would comport with the balancing 
test courts are required to undertake when confronted with questions of 
exclusion.
20
  Finally, courts should not be deterred by arguments that the 
Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment retroactivity doctrine precludes 
application of the expanded good-faith exception.
21
  The few courts that 
                                                                                                                 
evidence in reasonable reliance on case law). 
 16. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 700 (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 
(2006)). 
 17. See, e.g., McCane, 573 F.3d at 1044 (explaining that in accordance with the 
principles expressed in Herring, “it would be proper . . . to apply the good-faith exception to 
a search justified under the settled case law of a United States Court of Appeals, but later 
rendered unconstitutional by a Supreme Court decision”); accord United States v. Gray, No. 
4:09CR3089, 2009 WL 4739740, at *6 (D. Neb. Dec. 7, 2009) (stating that a police officer’s 
reliance on overruled case law does not result in the application of the exclusionary rule); 
United States v. McGhee, 672 F. Supp. 2d 804, 812 (S.D. Ohio 2009) (admitting evidence 
obtained by a police officer acting in reliance on pre-Gant precedent because the officer 
reasonably relied on the case law and did not act in bad faith); United States v. Lee, No. 07-
04050-01-CR-C-NKL, 2009 WL 3762404, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 10, 2009) (stating that 
officers’ reliance in good-faith on precedent pre-Gant is defensible, even if the search is 
unconstitutional post-Gant); United States v. Lopez, No. 6:06-120-DCR, 2009 WL 
3112127, at *3–4 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 23, 2009) (explaining that no benefit would be realized by 
suppressing evidence obtained by an officer acting in reasonable reliance on settled case law 
that was subsequently overturned); United States v. Owens, No. 5:09-cr-14/RS, 2009 WL 
2584570, at *3 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 20, 2009) (holding that a police officer acting in reasonable 
reliance on the settled case law of the United States Court of Appeals does not commit 
misconduct when that law is later ruled unconstitutional); United States v. Allison, 637 F. 
Supp. 2d 657, 672 (S.D. Iowa 2009) (“[A] law enforcement officer’s objective, good-faith 
reliance on doctrine derived from case law does not warrant application of the exclusionary 
rule.”); United States v. Grote, 629 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1206 (E.D. Wash. 2009) (recognizing 
that there is “no deterrent effect to be gained [by applying] the exclusionary rule” in a 
situation where a police officer relies on case law that is subsequently invalidated). 
 18. See supra note 2 (comparing the current uses of the good-faith exception post-Gant 
and Herring). 
 19. See infra Part III.A (discussing how Leon supports expanding the good-faith 
exception). 
 20. See Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 700 (explaining that the exclusionary rule was designed 
to deter future violations of the Fourth Amendment, and that for the rule to apply, its 
deterrent benefits must outweigh its associated costs). 
 21. See infra Part III.B (explaining that the Supreme Court’s retroactivity doctrine does 
not preclude use of the good-faith exception where police officers reasonably rely upon case 
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have adopted this approach have misinterpreted the Court’s retroactivity 
precedent and many of the arguments they employ are overstated. 
Part I of this Comment will examine the historical development of the 
good-faith exception through Herring.  Part II will discuss the split in 
authority that has come about as a result of the Supreme Court’s decisions 
in Gant and Herring.  Finally, Part III will analyze arguments for and 
against broadening the scope of the good-faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule, ultimately concluding that the good-faith exception 
should include a police officer’s objectively reasonable reliance on settled 
case law that is subsequently overruled. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE GOOD-FAITH EXCEPTION TO THE 
EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
The Fourth Amendment does not contain a textual remedy for the 
violations of its dictates.
22
  Over time, however, the Supreme Court 
developed a cogent rule mandating the exclusion of some illegally obtained 
evidence from trial.
23
  Although this rule was initially limited to federal 
prosecutions, the Court explained that the exclusionary rule was of 
constitutional character, and therefore, must apply in state prosecutions as 
well.
24
 
Prominent jurists and commentators argued that the early formulation of 
the exclusionary rule swept too broadly.
25
  Excluding evidence obtained in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment hindered the traditional truth-finding 
functions of the courts, and frustrated the judicial system’s goal of 
punishing the guilty.
26
  Many believed that more was required to restrict the 
                                                                                                                 
law that has been overruled by the Supreme Court). 
 22. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized.”).  
 23. See Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 699 (noting that the Court has created a rule that, when 
applicable, disallows the admission of “improperly obtained evidence at trial” (citing Weeks 
v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914))).  For a detailed account of the history leading 
up to the incorporation of the exclusionary rule see generally Potter Stewart, The Road to 
Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond:  The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule 
in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365 (1983). 
 24. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that any evidence obtained by 
unconstitutional searches and seizures is inadmissible in state court).  
 25. See Paul Simon, Comment, The Fourth Amendment’s Exclusionary Rule—Judicial 
Remedy or Constitutional Mandate:  Is There Room for the “Good Faith” Exception?, 41 S. 
TEX. L. REV. 1101, 1122 (2000) (discussing Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in California v. 
Minjares, 443 U.S. 916, 927 (1979), and supporting the proposition that Justice Rehnquist 
“would prefer to see the Exclusionary Rule abolished in both state and federal 
prosecutions”). 
 26. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984) (“The substantial social costs 
exacted by the exclusionary rule for the vindication of Fourth Amendment rights have long 
been a source of concern.”); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734 (1980) (“Our cases 
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“substantial costs” the exclusionary rule placed on the judicial system 
specifically, and on society in general.
27
  Proponents of limiting the rule’s 
applicability eventually found their vehicle in United States v. Leon,
28
 
which established the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
29
 
A. United States v. Leon
30
—A Framework for Balancing Deterrence and 
Social Costs to Determine When the Exclusionary Rule Applies 
In 1981, a confidential informant’s tip led police down an investigative 
trail that culminated with a search of Alberto Leon’s residence, where 
police seized a large quantity of narcotics.
31
  In conducting their search, the 
police acted pursuant to a facially valid search warrant issued by a state 
superior court judge.
32
  The district court reviewing the case subsequently 
invalidated the search because it found that the affidavit supporting the 
warrant was insufficient  
to establish probable cause.
33
  The government argued that the court should 
not suppress the evidence because the officers conducting the search 
reasonably relied in good-faith on a judicial determination of probable 
cause.
34
  Although the trial and appellate courts disagreed with this 
contention, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and accepted the 
government’s argument, establishing the foundation of the modern good-
faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
35
 
To support its conclusion, the Supreme Court first had to weaken the 
apparent strength of the exclusionary rule as it had been established in 
Weeks v. United States
36
 and Mapp v. Ohio.
37
  Justice Byron White, writing 
                                                                                                                 
have consistently recognized that unbending application of the exclusionary sanction . . . 
would impede unacceptably the truth-finding functions of judge and jury.”); Stone v. 
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490 (1976) (“The disparity in particular cases between the error 
committed by the police officer and the windfall afforded a guilty defendant by application 
of the [exclusionary] rule is contrary to the idea of proportionality that is essential to the 
concept of justice.”). 
 27. See Simon, supra note 25, at 1126 (noting that the Court “had been trolling for a 
case . . . that would substantially eliminate the rights secured under” the cases establishing 
the exclusionary rule). 
 28. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
 29. See id. at 922–23 (holding that the exclusionary rule should not apply to  
a law enforcement officer’s reasonable reliance on a facially sufficient judicial 
determination of probable cause later deemed invalid).  
 30. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
 31. Id. at 901. 
 32. Id. at 902. 
 33. Id. at 903. 
 34. Id. at 904. 
 35. Id. at 905. 
 36. 232 U.S. 383 (1914); see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949) (explaining that 
Weeks was the first case to hold that in a federal prosecution, evidence obtained in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment must be excluded).  
 37. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 906 (explaining that the Fourth Amendment “‘has never been 
interpreted to proscribe the introduction of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings’” 
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for the Court, articulated a new balancing test to determine when the 
remedy of exclusion applies.
38
  The Court explained that exclusion is only 
appropriate in cases where, after “weighing the costs and benefits of 
preventing the use . . . of inherently trustworthy tangible evidence,” the 
benefits of exclusion outweigh “[t]he substantial social costs exacted by the 
exclusionary rule.”
39
  Justice White concluded that the balancing test 
strongly implied that the exclusionary rule should be altered to allow for 
the admission of evidence acquired on a “reasonable good-faith belief that 
a search or seizure was in accord with the Fourth Amendment.”
40
   
Emphasizing that the exclusionary rule was not an individual 
constitutional right, the Court explained that the rule applied only when 
exclusion was capable of deterring future violations of the Fourth 
Amendment.
41
  Based on this conclusion, the majority highlighted three 
reasons why evidence obtained in good-faith reliance on a facially valid 
search warrant should not be suppressed.
42
  First, the purpose of the 
exclusionary rule was to respond only to the transgressions of police 
officers in an attempt to dissuade them from committing future breaches of 
the Fourth Amendment.
43
  The exclusionary rule was never designed to 
punish the mistakes of judicial actors.
44
  Second, the Court noted that even 
if the exclusionary rule was designed to deter judicial actors, it found no 
evidence to support the proposition that judicial actors were “inclined to 
ignore or subvert the Fourth Amendment.”
45
  Finally, Justice White 
reasoned that there was no basis “for believing that exclusion of evidence 
seized pursuant to a warrant [would] have a significant deterrent effect” on 
judicial officers.
46
  This logic provided the necessary foundation for the 
                                                                                                                 
(quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976))).  The Leon opinion began by 
loosening the exclusionary rule from its perceived constitutional moorings.  Id.; see Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (applying the exclusionary rule to the states); see also Smith 
v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221 (1982) (recognizing that federal courts do not have 
“supervisory authority over state judicial proceedings” and may only intervene to correct 
constitutional violations).  
 38. Leon, 468 U.S. at 906–07. 
 39. Id. at 907. 
 40. Id. at 909 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 255 (1983) (White, J., 
concurring)). 
 41. See id. at 906 (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)). 
 42. Id. at 916.  For a strong critique of the Court’s reasoning in Leon, see generally 
Simon, supra note 25, at 1126–39. 
 43. Leon, 468 U.S. at 916. The Court explained that a neutral magistrate’s 
determination of probable cause is a “more reliable safeguard against improper searches” 
than a law enforcement officer’s judgment because judges are not motivated by the same 
biases as law enforcement. Id. at 913–14. 
 44. Id. at 916. 
 45. Id.  This point has stirred controversy.  The Court itself cited several studies in 
contrast to its position, but disregarded them.  Id. at 916 n.14.  Commentators have 
suggested that this argument “deserves little credence.”  Donald Dripps, Living with Leon, 
95 YALE L.J. 906, 916 (1986).   
 46. Leon, 468 U.S. at 916. 
OKLEWICZ_OFF_TO_PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 9/3/2010  10:47 AM 
2010] EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF THE GOOD-FAITH EXCEPTION 1723 
Court’s ultimate holding that exclusion is an inappropriate remedy when 
evidence is obtained by a police officer who acts in an objectively good-
faith reliance upon a facially valid search warrant that is subsequently 
deemed invalid.
47
 
Although the Court cut back dramatically on the scope of the 
exclusionary rule,
48
 the majority was wary of particular circumstances 
where exclusion remained an appropriate remedy.
49
  The Court noted that if 
an affiant misleads the judicial officer issuing the warrant by providing 
information that the affiant knew or should have known was false, courts 
could suppress the evidence obtained from the officer’s reliance on the 
defective warrant.
50
  The majority also declined to extend the exception to 
instances where the judicial officer issuing the warrant “wholly abandoned 
his judicial role.”
51
  In addition, the Court found that exclusion would be a 
possible when a warrant was based on an affidavit that was so sufficiently 
bereft of probable cause that no reasonable officer could be justified in 
relying upon it.
52
  Finally, the Court held that the good-faith exception 
applies only to warrants that are valid on their face.
53
  If, for example, the 
warrant fails to meet the standards of particularization required by the 
Fourth Amendment, an officer cannot be said to have reasonably relied 
upon it, thus necessitating exclusion of the evidence obtained through the 
warrant’s issuance.
54
 
                                                 
 47. Id. at 919–22.  The Court made several auxiliary arguments to support this 
conclusion. Justice White noted that when police act within the scope of a seemingly valid 
search warrant, they are not acting illegally.  Id. at 921.  If a warrant is facially valid, the 
police officer’s inquiry into its reasonableness ends because it is not within the province of 
executive branch officers to question the judicial officer’s determination of probable cause.  
Id.  Once a judicial actor issues a valid warrant, “‘there is literally nothing more the 
policeman can do in seeking to comply with the law.’”  Id. (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 
U.S. 465, 498 (1976)).  From this, the Court determined that holding a police officer 
responsible for a judge or magistrate’s mistake could not rationally be expected to prevent 
future violations of the Constitution.  Id.  
 48. See Simon, supra note 25, at 1128 (arguing that the Court in Leon effectively 
overruled Weeks and Mapp). 
 49. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922. 
 50. Id. at 923.  When a defense attorney believes the affiant has intentionally or 
recklessly misled an issuing magistrate or judge, the attorney will file a Franks motion in an 
attempt to void the search warrant.  See generally Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) 
(holding that at a defendant’s request, a hearing must be held if there is a “substantial 
preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless 
disregard for the truth, was included . . . in [the] search warrant affidavit”).  
 51. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923.  This is a particularly interesting caveat given the fact that to 
support its holding, the majority argued that there was “no evidence” to suggest magistrates 
engage in this behavior in the first place.  Id. at 916.  Regardless of this perceived 
inconsistency, this conclusion follows logically from the Court’s reasoning that deterrence is 
ineffective against judges and magistrates because they “are not adjuncts to the law 
enforcement team.”  Id. at 917. 
 52. Id. at 923.  This exception to the Court’s holding appears to be little more than an 
example of a judicial officer wholly abandoning his or her judicial role. 
 53. Id.  
 54. Id.  
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B. Illinois v. Krull
55
—Applying the Leon Framework to a Law 
Enforcement Officer’s Reasonable Reliance on a State Statute that is 
Subsequently Declared Unconstitutional 
Three years after the Supreme Court decided Leon, it faced the question 
of whether to expand the good-faith doctrine to include a police officer’s 
reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalided state statute.
56
  In an 
attempt to curb the trade in stolen cars, the Illinois state legislature passed a 
law requiring people in the business of selling automobiles to obtain a 
license from the Illinois Secretary of State.
57
  The law mandated that these 
licensees keep thorough records of any vehicle bought or sold by the 
business, including each vehicle’s identification number.
58
  The statute 
provided state officials with authority to review the licensee’s records at 
any reasonable time, and allowed officials to inspect the licensee’s place of 
business to verify the accuracy of the records.
59
  Acting pursuant to this 
statutory authority, a police officer inspected several cars on Albert Krull’s 
lot and determined that a number of them were stolen.
60
  The officer then 
seized the vehicles and arrested Krull.
61
  The day after the search of Krull’s 
property, a federal district court declared the statute on which the officer 
relied unconstitutional.
62
   
In analyzing the question, the Supreme Court closely followed its 
decision in Leon.
63
  Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, explained 
that like judicial officers, legislators are not “adjuncts to the law 
enforcement team.”
64
  Although legislatures pass laws permitting police 
officers to act with certain authority, the majority found that there was no 
                                                 
 55. 480 U.S. 340 (1987). 
 56. Id. at 346. 
 57. Id. at 342. 
 58. Id. at 343. 
 59. Id. (citing 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-401(e) (1981)) (citing ILL. REV. STAT., 
ch. 95 1/2, ¶ 5-401(e) (1981) (repealed 1983)).  
 60. Id. 
 61. Id.  
 62. Id. at 344 (ruling that the statute granted authorities too much discretion in their 
ability to conduct warrantless searches).  
 63. See George M. Dery, III, Good Enough for Government Work:  The Court’s 
Dangerous Decision, in Herring v. United States, to Limit the Exclusionary Rule to Only the 
Most Culpable Police Behavior, 20 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 1, 11–12 (2009) (observing 
that the Krull court “steered so closely to Leon that it simply echoed many of Leon’s 
propositions”).  An example of this similarity can be found at the outset of the opinion 
where the Court reaffirmed the notion that the exclusionary rule is not a constitutional right, 
and should only operate when it can deter future violations of the Fourth Amendment.  
Krull, 480 U.S. at 347. 
 64. Krull, 480 U.S. at 350–51.  This claim suggests that since legislators have no stake 
in the outcome of criminal prosecutions, deterring evidence in those very proceedings will 
have little, if any, deterrent effect to prevent future violations of the Constitution by these 
actors.  Id. at 351. 
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evidence to suggest legislatures knowingly enact statutes to permit 
violations of the Constitution they take an oath to uphold.
65
 
Justice Blackmun explained that courts have the ability to invalidate 
state legislation when it infringes upon the Constitution, and by doing so, 
the courts send a message to the legislature that evidence obtained pursuant 
to the invalidated law will no longer be admissible at trial.
66
  The majority 
argued that the “extreme sanction of exclusion” would not operate to deter 
potential legislative malfeasance before a court declared the law 
unconstitutional.
67
  Even if exclusion did provide a modicum of deterrence, 
when weighed against the substantial costs the remedy imposes on the 
judicial system and society, the Court concluded that application of the rule 
would be unjustified.
68
 
Like Leon, however, the majority limited the scope of its holding to 
situations where the officer’s reliance on the state statute was objectively 
reasonable.
69
  The Court found that if a legislature “wholly abandon[s] its 
responsibility to enact constitutional laws,” law enforcement’s reliance on 
the defective statute would be unreasonable.
70
  Furthermore, if the statute 
was so egregious that a reasonable officer should have known that it was 
unconstitutional on its face, reliance on the statute would not operate to 
preclude exclusion.
71
  Because the statute appeared legitimate when the 
officer searched Krull’s property, the Court held that officer’s good-faith 
reliance on the law prevented suppression of the evidence obtained against 
Krull.
72
 
C. Arizona v. Evans
73
—Including Reasonable Reliance on the Clerical 
Errors of Court Employees Within the Leon Framework 
The last of the early good-faith cases was Arizona v. Evans.  In January 
1991, Isaac Evans was pulled over for driving the wrong way down a one-
                                                 
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. at 352.  The usual result of invalidating a state statute is that the legislature either 
repeals or amends the defective enactment, thus resolving the constitutional discrepancy.  
Id. 
 67. Id. at 351–52.  The majority adopted language from Leon, stating that “‘[p]enalizing 
the officer for the [legislature’s] error, rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the 
deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations.’”  Id. at 350 (quoting United States v. Leon, 
468 U.S. 897, 921 (1984)).  
 68. Id. at 352–53.   
 69. Id. at 355. 
 70. Id. (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 (1984)). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 360.  The Court appeared to find support for this conclusion, at least in part, 
from a passage Justice Blackmun quoted from Leon:  “‘[e]xcluding evidence will not further 
the ends of the exclusionary rule in any appreciable way; for it is painfully apparent that . . . 
the officer is acting as a reasonable officer would and should act in similar circumstances. 
Excluding the evidence can in no way affect his future conduct unless it is to make him less 
willing to do his duty.’”  Id. at 349 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 920 (1984)). 
 73. 514 U.S. 1 (1995). 
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way street.
74
  After Evans informed the officer that his license had been 
suspended, the officer ran a check of Evans’ record.
75
  The inspection 
revealed that Evans had a warrant out for his arrest.
76
  When the officer 
took Evans into custody on the basis of that warrant, a marijuana cigarette 
fell out of his possession, prompting the officer to search Evans’ vehicle 
where he discovered more marijuana.
77
 
As it turned out, a justice of the peace had quashed the warrant seventeen 
days before Evans’ arrest.
78
  There was no indication, however, that any 
court clerk called the sheriff’s office to have the office remove the warrant 
from its computer records pursuant to established procedure.
79
  The Court 
was faced with the question of whether exclusion was an appropriate 
remedy when evidence was obtained by an officer acting in good-faith 
reliance upon computer records, which indicated the existence of an 
outstanding arrest warrant for a suspect, when those records were later 
discovered to be erroneous.
80
 
Disagreeing with the Arizona Supreme Court, the majority found that 
“[a]pplication of the Leon framework support[ed] a categorical exception to 
the exclusionary rule for clerical errors of court employees.”
81
  Assuming 
that court employees were responsible for the error, the majority noted that 
excluding evidence at trial would not deter similar mistakes by these actors 
in the future, in part, because court employees had no interest in the 
outcome of individual criminal prosecutions.
82
  Furthermore, the Court 
indicated that the clerk’s mistake in this case was too minor to justify 
applying the severe remedy of exclusion.
83
  Therefore, after finding that the 
officer’s reliance on the computer record was objectively reasonable,
84
 the 
Court reversed the lower court’s decision.
85
 
                                                 
 74. Id. at 4.  Interestingly, the officer observed Evans’ conduct from his police station, 
which was located on the street where Evans was driving.  Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 5. 
 80. Id. at 3–4. 
 81. Id. at 16.  The Arizona Supreme Court held that while the exclusionary rule may be 
inappropriate in circumstances where the magistrate “‘issued a facially valid warrant . . . 
based on an erroneous evaluation of the facts, the law, or both,’” invocation of the rule was 
“‘useful and proper’” when an unlawful arrest had resulted from “‘negligent record 
keeping.’”  Id. at 9–10 (quoting State v. Evans, 866 P.2d 869, 872 (Ariz. 1994)). 
 82. Id. at 14–15 (explaining that there was nothing to suggest that court employees were 
likely to disregard the Fourth Amendment). 
 83. Id. at 15–16. 
 84. Id.  Chief Justice Rehnquist agreed with the trial court that the officer “would have 
been derelict in his duty if he failed to arrest [Evans].”  Id. at 15.  Therefore, he determined 
that there was no indication that the officer’s reliance on the computer record was 
unreasonable.  Id. at 15–16. 
 85. Id. at 16.  
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D. Herring v. United States
86
—Focusing on Individual Law Enforcement 
Culpability to Determine When the Exclusionary Rule Applies 
For fifteen years after Evans, the Supreme Court did not alter the Leon 
framework.  In Herring v. United States, however, the Court took the 
opportunity to expand the scope of the good-faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule, moving beyond the core rationale of the Leon line of 
cases.
87
 
In 2004, a police officer asked his department’s warrant clerk to check if 
there were any warrants out for the arrest of Bennie Dean Herring.
88
  When 
the record search failed to return any outstanding warrants, the officer 
asked the clerk to search a neighboring county’s database.
89
  That county’s 
database contained a record indicating that a warrant for Herring’s arrest 
was outstanding.
90
  Acting pursuant to this information, the police officer 
stopped Herring and arrested him.
91
  While conducting a search of 
Herring’s vehicle incident to the arrest, the officer found narcotics and an 
illegal firearm.
92
 
Shortly thereafter, the warrant clerk received information from the 
neighboring county that, in fact, there was no outstanding warrant for 
Herring’s arrest.
93
  The officers eventually discovered that through some 
mistake of the neighboring county’s police department, the records 
erroneously contained information indicating the existence of the arrest 
warrant.
94
  Although both the government and the defense agreed that the 
                                                 
 86. 129 S. Ct. 695, 704 (2009). 
 87. See Id. at 704 (holding that “when police mistakes are the result of negligence . . . 
rather than systemic error or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements, any marginal 
deterrence” will not be sufficient to warrant exclusion); see also Dery, supra note 63, at 13–
16 (arguing that Leon, Krull, and Evans were all premised on the distinction between the 
effect of deterrence on judicial and executive actors).  Since the case was decided in January 
of 2009, it has been widely criticized.  For a particularly blistering attack on the Herring 
decision, see generally Wayne R. LaFave, The Smell of Herring:  A Critique of the Supreme 
Court’s Latest Assault on the Exclusionary Rule, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 757 (2009), 
which categorized Herring as one of the most egregious decisions on search and seizure law 
in the Supreme Court’s history. 
 88. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 698.  The petitioner asserted that the officer was only 
interested in arresting Herring because the officer possessed animosity over Herring’s report 
that the officer had been involved in the murder of a local youth.  Dery, supra note 63, at 
16–17.  
 89. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 698. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id.  
 93. Id.  Roughly ten to fifteen minutes elapsed from the time that the officer discovered 
there was an outstanding warrant to the time the warrant clerk was notified that the 
information regarding the warrant was incorrect.  Id. 
 94. Id.  The standard procedure was that the other county’s warrant clerk  
would keep hard copies of all outstanding warrants.  Id.  When those warrants were 
quashed, the clerk would remove the hard copies and would enter the necessary information 
into the police department’s database.  Id.  The clerk was unable to find the hardcopy of the 
warrant, leading her to contact the court clerk who informed her that the warrant had been 
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arrest was a violation of the Fourth Amendment, the parties disagreed as to 
whether the evidence obtained as a result of this violation should be 
excluded.
95
  The Supreme Court was asked whether evidence should be 
suppressed when it is obtained as a result of an arrest made in reasonable 
reliance on a police department record, when that record is subsequently 
determined to be inaccurate due to the negligent actions of law enforcement 
personnel.
96
 
Herring began, as did all the previous good-faith cases, by reaffirming 
the concept that the exclusionary rule is not a personal constitutional right, 
but a court created doctrine designed to deter future violations of the Fourth 
Amendment.
97
  The Court emphasized that suppression is an “extreme 
sanction” appropriately applied only when the benefits outweigh its 
“substantial social costs.”
98
  Nevertheless, that is where most of the 
similarities with the previous good-faith cases ended.
99
 
Rather than analyzing the three factors laid out in Leon to determine 
whether exclusion was an appropriate remedy in light of its potential 
deterrent effect, the Court chose to focus on the culpability of the warrant 
clerk’s conduct to decide if the error required suppression.
100
  Chief Justice 
Roberts, writing for the majority, noted that the exclusionary rule came 
                                                                                                                 
recalled five months earlier.  Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id.  The Eleventh Circuit held that the evidence was admissible under the good-faith 
exception because the error on which the arrest was based was “merely negligent and 
attenuated from the arrest,” and because the benefits gained from exclusion would be 
minimal when compared to the costs.  Id.    
 97. Id. at 699 (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974));  
see Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10 (1995) (stating that the exclusionary rule is a judicial 
construct operating as a law enforcement officer deterrent (citing Calandra, 414 U.S. at 
348)); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347 (1987) (stating that the exclusionary rule’s 
purpose is to deter Fourth Amendment violations by law enforcement officers (citing 
Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348)); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (affirming 
that the exclusionary rule is meant to have a deterrent effect on law enforcement officers 
(citing Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348)).   
 98. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 700 (quoting Krull, 480 U.S. at 352–53).  The Court noted 
that the exclusionary rule’s “‘costly toll upon truth-seeking and law enforcement objectives 
presents a high obstacle for those urging [its] application.’”  Id. at 701 (quoting Pa. Bd. of 
Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 364–65 (1998)). 
 99. See Dery, supra note 63, at 21 (noting that “the Herring Court took a dramatic 
departure from its past decisions”).  
 100. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 700–01.  The first factor mentioned in the previous good-faith 
exception cases was that the exclusionary rule was “designed ‘to deter police misconduct 
rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates.’”  Krull, 480 U.S. at 348.  
Because police action, rather than executive or judicial action, was at issue in Herring, the 
Court would find an immediate conflict with this factor.  The second factor these courts 
addressed was whether there existed any evidence suggesting the particular actors at issue 
were “inclined to ignore or subvert the Fourth Amendment or that lawlessness among these 
actors require[d] application of the extreme sanction of exclusion.”  Id.  The final factor 
analyzed by Leon and its progeny was whether there was a “basis ‘for believing that 
exclusion of evidence seized pursuant to a warrant would have a significant deterrent 
effect’” on the particular actor’s behavior.  Id.  This final factor was of the “greatest 
importance” to these courts.  Id. 
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about as a response to “intentional conduct that was patently 
unconstitutional.”
101
  Under the majority’s view, errors arising from 
isolated instances of negligence did not warrant exclusion because they 
were not the result of the type of conduct that the rule was designed to 
counteract.
102
  Explaining that an analysis of the flagrancy of law 
enforcement malfeasance “constitute[d] an important step in the calculus of 
[whether to apply] the exclusionary rule,” the Court stated that “police 
conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully 
deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price 
paid by the justice system.”
103
  According to the Court, the negligent 
conduct of the warrant clerk did not meet this level of culpability.
104
  
Therefore, the Court declined to suppress the evidence.
105
 
The Court limited the scope of its holding by taking note of two 
situations that could require exclusion.
106
  First, if the defendant was able to 
demonstrate that the police department either created fictitious records for 
the purpose of making otherwise unlawful arrests, or was reckless in 
maintaining their record-keeping system, exclusion would be justified.
107
  
Second, the majority noted that suppression may be an appropriate remedy 
if the defense could show that the arrest was a result of systemic errors 
rather than isolated instances of negligence.
108
  The Court explained that 
reliance on a system that produces widespread errors could not be 
objectively reasonable; therefore, the good-faith exception would not 
apply.
109
 
                                                 
 101. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702. 
 102. See id. (asserting that an error resulting from “nonrecurring and attenuated 
negligence is . . . far removed from” the concerns that led the Court to adopt the 
exclusionary rule). 
 103. Id. at 701–02.   
 104. Id. at 703. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See id. (discussing exclusion in Franks and Leon). The Court, in both Leon and 
Krull, took similar approaches to limiting the scope of the good-faith exception.  See Illinois 
v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 355 (1987) (preventing the good-faith exception from applying to 
situations where “the legislature wholly abandon[s] its responsibility to enact constitutional 
laws,” or where a law is patently unconstitutional); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 
(1984) (declining to expand the good-faith exception to situations where a judicial officer 
“wholly abandons his judicial role,” where an affiant provides information that he knows or 
should know is false, where a warrant is so lacking in probable cause to render reliance on it 
unreasonable, or where the warrant is facially deficient).  The Court in Evans declined to 
cabin its holding to only reasonable clerical errors.  Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 16 
(1995).  
 107. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 703.  This follows from the Court’s reasoning that the 
exclusionary rule can only deter sufficiently culpable conduct.  Id. at 702.  
 108. Id. at 704.  The majority found support for this contention in Justice O’Connor’s 
concurring opinion in Evans, where she stated that “it would not be reasonable for the police 
to rely . . . on a recordkeeping system . . . that routinely leads to false arrests.”  Id. (citing 
Evans, 514 U.S. at 17 (O’Connor, J., concurring)).  
 109. Id. at 703–04. 
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After Herring, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule must be 
analyzed in two different contexts.
110
  The Leon line of cases focused on 
errors committed by legislative and judicial branch actors, which ultimately 
resulted in a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
111
  In these situations, 
courts are required to analyze the three Leon factors to determine whether 
the deterrent benefit provided by exclusion outweighs its attendant costs.
112
  
When legislative or judicial actors are at fault, the Supreme Court has 
regularly found that they do not.
113
 
Herring, on the other hand, focused on errors committed by law 
enforcement officers that ultimately resulted in a constitutional violation.
114
  
When police conduct is at issue, courts must determine the individual 
actor’s level of culpability.
115
  If the police action resulting in the violation 
was deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent, the benefit of deterrence 
provided by suppression may outweigh the costs to society, thus justifying 
application of the exclusionary rule.
116
  If, however, the level of culpability 
is merely negligent and attenuated from the constitutional violation, the 
marginal deterrent benefits provided by exclusion do not justify its 
associated costs.
117
  Following the promulgation of Herring, prosecutors 
quickly sought to expand the good-faith exception to include an officer’s 
reasonable reliance on well-settled case law that is later overruled.
118
  The 
resulting decisions gave rise to a distinct split in the circuits.
119
 
                                                 
 110. See Dery, supra note 62, at 12 (“The cases regarding the good faith exception 
before Herring bound themselves to the distinction Leon established between the executive 
and judicial branches of government.”). 
 111. Id. 
 112. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 (1984). 
 113. See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 16 (1995) (expanding the good-faith exception to 
include a police officer’s reasonable reliance on the clerical errors of court employees); 
Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 359–60 (1987) (applying the good-faith exception to 
instances where a police officer reasonably relies on an apparently valid state statute that is 
subsequently ruled unconstitutional); Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 (holding that a law enforcement 
officer’s good-faith reliance on a facially valid warrant issued by a judge or magistrate that 
is subsequently found to be deficient does not justify exclusion of the evidence obtained in 
compliance with that warrant). 
 114. See Dery, supra note 63, at 21–22 (noting that the Court focused on the “level of 
police impropriety” to conclude that the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule varies 
depending on the degree to which police conduct violates the Fourth Amendment). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 702 (2009). 
 117. Id. at 704.  
 118. See, e.g., United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1040 (10th Cir. 2009) (noting 
that while the defendant’s case was on appeal, the Supreme Court handed down Gant, which 
prompted the government to raise the good-faith exception argument), cert. denied, 130 S. 
Ct. 1686 (2010).  The decision in Herring was announced on January 14, 2009.  129 S. Ct. 
at 695.  The Tenth Circuit decided McCane on July 28, 2009.  573 F.3d at 1037.  In 
McCane, however, the United States first made its good-faith argument on May 4, 2009.  
Supplemental Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 11, United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 
1040 (10th Cir. 2009) (No. 08-6235). 
 119. Compare United States v. Davis, 598 F.3d 1259, 1264 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding 
that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule includes a police officer’s reasonable 
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II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT:  A TREND TOWARD EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF 
THE GOOD-FAITH EXCEPTION 
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Gant, lower courts grappled with 
the question of whether to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a police 
officer’s reasonable reliance on the previously settled case law that Gant 
overruled.
120
  The majority of courts decided to expand the good-faith 
exception to preclude the suppression of evidence obtained by a police 
officer acting in objectively reasonable reliance on the settled precedent 
invalidated by Gant.
121
  Other courts, however, chose to read the Supreme 
Court’s retroactivity doctrine as prohibiting the admission into evidence of 
contraband obtained in violation of the new rule announced in Gant.
122
 
A. The Tenth Circuit Extends the Good-Faith Exception to Include a 
Police Officer’s Reasonable Reliance on the Settled Case Law of a 
Jurisdiction that is Eventually Invalidated 
Before the Supreme Court’s rulings in Gant and Herring, few courts 
were willing to expand the good-faith exception to include an officer’s 
reasonable reliance on the settled case law of a jurisdiction.  In 1987, the 
                                                                                                                 
reliance on the well-settled and unequivocal decisions of the Eleventh Circuit), with United 
States v. Gonzalez, 578 F.3d 1130, 1133 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding that the Supreme Court’s 
Fourth Amendment retroactivity doctrine prohibits an expansion of the good-faith 
exception). 
 120. See Davis, 598 F.3d at 1262 (noting that the Gant decision had replaced its former 
interpretation of Belton); Gonzalez, 578 F.3d at 1133 (asserting that it could not apply the 
good-faith exception without creating tension with existing case law); McCane, 573 F.3d at 
1039 (holding that, in light of the Gant decision, the district court had erred in finding a 
search incident to arrest valid); United States v. Gray, No. 4:09CR3089, 2009 WL 4739740, 
at *5–6 (D. Neb. Dec. 7, 2009) (expressing uncertainty as to whether Leon would apply to 
pre-Gant searches); United States v. McGhee, 672 F. Supp. 2d 804, 811–12 (S.D. Ohio 
2009) (noting the divide among circuits as to whether Gant should be applied retroactively); 
United States v. Lee, No. 07-04050-01-CR-C-NKL, 2009 WL 3762404, at *2 (W.D. Mo. 
Nov. 10, 2009) (asserting that the good-faith exception should apply); United States v. 
Peoples, 668 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1044–45 (W.D. Mich. 2009) (holding that the retroactivity 
rule does not apply); United States v. Lopez, No. 6:06-120-DCR, 2009 WL 3112127, at *4 
(E.D. Ky. Sept. 23, 2009) (maintaining that the good-faith exception should apply because 
the officer was well-trained and acted reasonably); United States v. Owens, No. 5:09-cr-
14/RS, 2009 WL 2584570, at *3 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 20, 2009) (applying the good-faith 
exception because the search was not a result of officer misconduct); United States v. 
Allison, 637 F. Supp. 2d 657, 672 (S.D. Iowa 2009) (maintaining that evidence should not 
be suppressed because no wrongful conduct on the part of the police officers had occurred); 
United States v. Grote, 629 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1206 (E.D. Wash. 2009) (deciding not to 
apply the exclusionary rule because it would not have the effect of deterring future officer 
misconduct); United States v. Buford, 623 F. Supp. 2d 923, 927 (M.D. Tenn. 2009) 
(declining to extend the good-faith exception to cases of good faith reliance on subsequently 
overturned Supreme Court decisions). 
 121. Davis, 598 F.3d at 1264; McCane, 573 F.3d at 1039; Gray, 2009 WL 4739740, at 
*6; McGhee, 672 F. Supp. 2d at 812; Lee, 2009 WL 3762404, at *2; Lopez, 2009 WL 
3112127, at *4; Owens, 2009 WL 2584570, at *3; Allison, 637 F. Supp. 2d at 672; Grote, 
629 F. Supp. at 1206.  
 122. Gonzalez, 578 F.3d at 1133; Buford, 623 F. Supp. 2d at 927. 
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United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit became the first federal 
appellate court to hold that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule applied to evidence obtained by an officer who reasonably relied on 
settled case law that was later overturned.
123
  When presented with the 
question, the Fifth Circuit originally upheld the constitutionality of 
warrantless searches at a permanent checkpoint deemed to be the functional 
equivalent of the United States’ border with Mexico.
124
  Later, that same 
court reversed its earlier decision, and determined that these searches 
violated the Fourth Amendment.
125
 
Rather than exclude the evidence obtained in reliance on the earlier 
circuit precedent, the court held that the evidence was admissible pursuant 
to the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
126
  Although this ruling 
was novel, the decision failed to gain momentum with other courts and 
ultimately did not reach the Supreme Court for review.
127
  Over twenty 
years later, the Tenth Circuit addressed the question of whether to apply the 
good-faith exception to an officer’s reasonable reliance on pre-Gant 
precedent that was invalidated by the Supreme Court.
128
 
In 2007, Markice McCane was arrested after police determined that he 
was driving on a suspended license.
129
  The arresting officer handcuffed 
McCane and placed him in the back of his patrol car.
130
  Relying on the 
controlling precedent of the Tenth Circuit,
131
 the officer conducted a search 
incident to arrest of the passenger compartment of McCane’s automobile, 
ultimately finding a loaded handgun.
132
  McCane, a convicted felon, was 
charged with possession of a firearm in violation of federal law.
133
 
                                                 
 123. See United States v. Jackson, 825 F.2d 853, 866 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (holding 
that the exclusionary rule should not be applied to searches conducted which relied on the 
existing case law of the jurisdiction). 
 124. Id. at 857 (citing United States v. Jackson, 807 F.2d 1185, 1190 (5th Cir. 1986)). 
 125. Id. at 854. 
 126. Id. at 866.  The Fifth Circuit closely followed the Supreme Court’s rationale from 
Leon and concluded that suppressing the evidence would fail to advance the deterrent 
purpose of the exclusionary rule.  Id.  For example, the Fifth Circuit read the three factors 
from Leon as justifying its holding.  Id. at 865–66.   
 127. Id. 
 128. United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1040 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 
S. Ct. 1686 (2010). 
 129. Id. at 1038–39.  
 130. Id. at 1039. 
 131. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (holding that when a lawful 
arrest is made of an occupant or recent occupant of a vehicle, police may search the 
passenger area of that vehicle, and all containers located within, incident to the arrest); 
United States v. Humphrey, 208 F.3d 1190, 1202 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding that the Belton 
rule applies even when an arrestee is handcuffed and secured away from the scene of the 
search).  
 132. McCane, 573 F.3d at 1039.  
 133. Id. at 1040.  McCane was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006).  
This provision states:  “It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been convicted in 
any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one  
year . . . to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting 
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After the trial court found McCane guilty, he duly appealed his 
conviction.
134
  While the case was pending on direct appeal, the United 
States Supreme Court decided Arizona v. Gant, which explicitly prohibited 
the police officer’s search in McCane.
135
  “On facts almost identical” to 
those in McCane, the Supreme Court held that an officer may search the 
passenger compartment of a suspect’s vehicle incident to arrest so long as 
the suspect remains unsecured within the control area of the compartment, 
or the officer reasonably believes that evidence associated with the crime of 
arrest will be found in the vehicle.
136
  Although the Supreme Court 
affirmed the suppression of evidence obtained in violation of its decision in 
Gant,
137
 the Tenth Circuit took a different approach.
138
 
Rather than order the suppression of the evidence obtained from the now 
unlawful search of McCane’s vehicle, the Tenth Circuit upheld the 
admissibility of the evidence pursuant to the good-faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule.
139
  Relying on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Herring, the court held that the exclusionary rule should not apply in 
situations where an officer reasonably relies on the settled case law of a 
jurisdiction that is subsequently ruled unconstitutional.
140
  The court’s 
decision broadened the scope of the good-faith exception beyond any 
existing Supreme Court precedent.
141
 
To support its conclusion, the court recounted the familiar refrain found 
in each of the Supreme Court’s good-faith exception cases that the 
exclusionary rule is not an individual constitutional right, and should only 
be invoked where its deterrent effects outweigh its social costs.
142
  After 
reviewing the Supreme Court’s good-faith precedent, the court noted that 
two common themes have emerged from these decisions:  the exclusionary 
rule is designed to deter only unreasonable law enforcement conduct, and it 
                                                                                                                 
commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has 
been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.” Id. 
 134. McCane, 573 F.3d at 1040. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1718–19 (2009)).  
 137. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1723–24 (affirming the judgment of the Supreme Court of 
Arizona).  The Supreme Court of Arizona held that because the officer’s search was 
unlawful, the evidence obtained from it must be suppressed.  State v. Gant,  
162 P.3d 640, 646 (Ariz. 2007). 
 138. McCane, 573 F.3d at 1040. 
 139. Id. at 1045. 
 140. See id. at 1042–45 (applying the deterrence rationale used in  Herring). 
 141. See United States v. Gonzalez, 578 F.3d 1130, 1132 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that the 
Supreme Court has never decided the issue of whether the good-faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule applies in a situation where a search is “conducted under a then-prevailing 
interpretation of a Supreme Court ruling, but rendered unconstitutional by a subsequent 
Supreme Court ruling announced while the defendant’s conviction was on direct review”). 
 142. McCane, 573 F.3d at 1042.  The court also highlighted both the Leon and Evans 
incantations of the three-part test for determining when the exclusionary rule is 
appropriately applied.  Id. at 1042–43. 
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is not intended, nor is it able, to deter the conduct of actors in the judicial or 
legislative branches.
143
  Upon this foundation, the McCane court 
determined that application of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule was appropriate under the circumstances presented.
144
 
Judge Murphy, writing for the court, analogized the police officer’s 
conduct at issue in McCane to the officers’ conduct in Leon, Krull, and 
Evans.
145
  The court found the police officer’s reliance on the settled case 
law of the jurisdiction to be no more unreasonable than an officer’s reliance 
on a facially valid warrant, an apparently valid state statute, or the clerical 
error of a court employee.
146
  Judge Murphy noted that the exclusionary 
rule was not designed to punish the mistakes of judicial officers and that 
“no evidence” existed to support the assertion that judicial actors were 
likely to violate the Fourth Amendment.
147
  Therefore, the court reasoned 
that there was no basis to believe that suppressing evidence would have a 
significant deterrent effect on judges delegated the responsibility of 
interpreting the Constitution.
148
  Consequently, the court declined to 
exclude the evidence obtained from the officer’s reasonable reliance on the 
established precedent of Tenth Circuit that the Supreme Court later 
rendered null.
149
 
Shortly after the Tenth Circuit decided McCane, a clear trend developed 
in favor of applying the good-faith exception to law enforcement reliance 
on pre-Gant precedent.
150
  Federal district courts within the Sixth, Eighth, 
                                                 
 143. Id. at 1044.  The Supreme Court has consistently emphasized limitations on this 
point.  In Herring, the Court conceded that the exclusionary rule may be appropriate where 
law enforcement actors are reckless in maintaining their databases or make false entries for 
the purpose of making future arrests.  Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 703 (2009).  
Similar caveats were emphasized in both Krull and Leon.  See supra note 106.   
 144. McCane, 573 F.3d at 1044. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 1044–45 (“Relying upon the settled case law of a United States Court of 
Appeals certainly qualifies as objectively reasonable law enforcement behavior.”). 
 147. Id. at 1045. 
 148. Id. (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916–17 (1984)).  The court 
similarly argued that because the judicial branch is a neutral body with “no stake in the 
outcome of particular criminal prosecutions,” excluding evidence based on judges’ errors in 
interpreting the law would serve no real deterrent purpose.  Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. See United States v. Gray, No. 4:09CR3089, 2009 WL 4739740, at *6 (D. Neb. 
Dec. 7, 2009) (expanding the good-faith exception to include executive branch reliance on 
case law); United States v. McGhee, 672 F. Supp. 2d 804, 812 (S.D. Ohio 2009) 
(interpreting the good-faith exception to include reasonable reliance on settled precedent 
that is later invalidated); United States v. Lee, No. 07-04050-01-CR-C-NKL, 2009 WL 
3762404, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 10, 2009) (agreeing with the result in McCane); United 
States v. Lopez, No. 6:06-120-DCR, 2009 WL 3112127, at *4 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 23, 2009) 
(holding the good-faith exception includes a law enforcement officer’s objectively 
reasonable reliance on settled case law); United States v. Owens, No. 5:09-cr-14/RS, 2009 
WL 2584570, at *3 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 20, 2009) (finding that the good-faith exception applies 
to a search authorized by precedent that is subsequently overruled); United States v. Allison, 
637 F. Supp. 2d 657, 672 (S.D. Iowa 2009) (ruling that the good-faith exception precludes 
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and Eleventh Circuits were confronted with the same issue involving the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Gant, with a majority of these courts reaching 
an identical conclusion:  the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule 
encompasses an officer’s reasonable reliance on the settled case law of 
those jurisdictions that is subsequently overturned.
151
  Later, the Eleventh 
Circuit agreed with the Tenth and Fifth Circuits and refused “to apply the 
exclusionary rule when the police have reasonably relied on clear and well-
settled precedent.”
152
  Although the weight of authority clearly favors 
extending the good-faith exception to such a situation, several courts have 
explicitly declined to do so.
153
 
B. The %inth Circuit Holds that the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment 
Retroactivity Doctrine Prohibits Expansion of the Good-Faith Exception 
Addressing the same issue as presented to the Tenth Circuit in McCane, 
the Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected the government’s argument for a broad 
interpretation of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
154
  In 
United States v. Gonzalez, the police conducted a search of Ricardo 
Gonzalez’s vehicle incident to arrest based upon circuit precedent that the 
Gant decision invalidated.
155
  Rather than going into a detailed discussion 
regarding the government’s argument, the court acknowledged the good-
faith precedent in passing, and ruled that the Supreme Court’s retroactivity 
doctrine concerning new rules of criminal procedure controlled the 
outcome of the case.
156
 
                                                                                                                 
the suppression of evidence obtained as a result of a police officer’s reliance on the 
jurisdiction’s precedent); United States v. Grote, 629 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1206 (E.D. Wash. 
2009) (holding that the good-faith exception applies to searches conducted pursuant to 
settled case law).  But see United States v. Peoples, 668 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1050–51 (W.D. 
Mich. 2009) (declining to extend application of the good-faith exception to law enforcement 
reliance on case law); United States v. Buford, 623 F. Supp. 2d 923, 927 (M.D. Tenn. 2009) 
(rejecting the extension of the good-faith exception as anomalous to the Supreme Court’s 
Fourth Amendment retroactivity doctrine). 
 151. See supra note 150 (detailing the subsequent decisions of federal courts after the 
Tenth Circuit handed down its ruling in McCane). 
 152. United States v. Davis, 598 F.3d 1259, 1266 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 153. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 578 F.3d 1130, 1133 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding 
that the good-faith exception does not apply to an officer’s reliance on settled precedent); 
Buford, 623 F. Supp. at 927 (declining to expand the good-faith exception to include an 
officer’s reliance on case law).  
 154. Gonzalez, 578 F.3d at 1133.  The procedural posture in Gonzalez was quite different 
from that in McCane.  There, the defendant appealed his conviction, and while the case was 
pending before the court, the Supreme Court handed down Gant.  McCane, 573 F.3d at 
1039.  In Gonzalez, the court faced the question after the defendant’s original conviction 
was vacated by the Supreme Court and remanded for consideration in light of its opinion in 
Gant.  Gonzalez, 578 F.3d at 1131. 
 155. Gonzalez, 578 F.3d at 1131. 
 156. Id. at 1132. 
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In United States v. Johnson,
157
 the Supreme Court held that when a new 
rule of criminal procedure that interprets the Fourth Amendment is 
promulgated, that rule is to be applied to all cases pending on direct review 
at the time of the decision.
158
  The Court found that a failure to apply a new 
rule construing the Fourth Amendment to those cases violated three 
standards of constitutional law.
159
  First, drawing arbitrary lines as to when 
new rules would apply retroactively conflicts with norms of principled 
adjudication.
160
  Second, the Court found it incomprehensible that a new 
rule would be applied purely prospectively with the exception of the one 
party whose case was lucky enough to be chosen as the vehicle for the 
construction of the new rule.
161
  Finally, the Court noted that a 
discriminating application of new constitutional rules violates the principle 
that all similarly situated defendants should be treated equally.
162
   
After explaining the reasoning behind adopting this conception of 
retroactivity, the Johnson court left a piece of the pre-existing retroactivity 
precedent intact.
163
  The Court upheld the rule that if a new decision 
interpreting the Fourth Amendment constitutes “a clear break with the 
past,” then the rule is not retroactive.
164
  Five years after the ruling in 
Johnson, the Supreme Court revisited the question of retroactivity and held 
that “even decisions constituting a ‘clear break’ with past precedent have 
retroactive application.”
165
 
                                                 
 157. 457 U.S. 537 (1982). 
 158. Id. at 562.  
 159. Id. at 546–47.  Here, the Court adopted Justice Harlan’s arguments from his 
dissenting opinion in Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 256 (1969) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting), and his concurring opinion in Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675 
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 160. Johnson, 457 U.S. at 546. 
 161. Id. at 546–47.  The Court pointed to the different roles the legislative and judicial 
branches play in rulemaking.  Id.  Whereas the legislature makes rules prospective or 
retroactive as it sees fit, the judiciary has a duty to interpret the Constitution.  Id. at 547.  In 
fulfilling this duty, if the Court were to allow similar cases to pass without receiving the 
same benefit as the one case that operated to create the new rule, then the Court would be 
engaging in “an indefensible departure from [the] model of judicial review.”  Id. (quoting 
Mackey, 401 U.S. at 678–79 (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
 162. Johnson, 457 U.S. at 547. 
 163. See id. at 549 (adhering to past doctrine which found that “where the Court has 
expressly declared a rule of criminal procedure to be a clear break with the past, it almost 
invariably has gone on to find such a newly minted principle nonretroactive”) (citation 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 164. Id. (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 248 (1969)).  When Johnson was 
decided, it was premised on a multi-factor test outlined by cases such as Johnson v. %ew 
Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966), and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).  In Stovall, the 
Court held that a determination of a new rule’s retroactivity should be made after weighing:  
“(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law 
enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of 
justice of a retroactive application of the new standards.”  388 U.S. at 297.  When a new rule 
constitutes a clear break with the past, it fails the last two Stovall factors, requiring it to be 
applied only prospectively.  Johnson, 457 U.S. at 549–50.  
 165. United States v. Gonzalez, 578 F.3d 1130, 1132 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Griffith v. 
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The Gonzalez court argued that if it were to accept the government’s 
contention that the good-faith exception applied to reasonable reliance on 
case law, the decision would undermine the Supreme Court’s settled 
retroactivity precedent.
166
  Judge Betty Fletcher, author of the Gonzalez 
opinion, feared that application of the good-faith exception would 
transform the courts from judicial bodies deciding cases and controversies 
into de facto legislatures with the authority to announce new rules without 
applying them.
167
  Furthermore, the court contended that adopting the 
government’s argument would have the improper effect of treating two 
similarly situated defendants in fundamentally different ways.
168
  Because 
the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision to suppress the 
evidence obtained against the defendant in Gant, allowing the conviction 
against Gonzalez to stand would conflict with the same principles outlined 
in Johnson and its progeny.
169
  On these grounds, the court ruled that 
exclusion of the evidence was required, and Gonzalez’s conviction was 
reversed.
170
 
Although several courts have adopted the retroactivity doctrine as a 
barrier to extending the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, the 
majority of courts deciding the issue have rejected such an argument.
171
  As 
                                                                                                                 
Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987)). 
 166. Id.  It is important to note that the Court in Johnson, though decided two years 
before Leon created the good-faith exception, addressed an argument similar to that made by 
the government in Gonzalez.  Johnson, 457 U.S. at 559–60.  There, the government argued 
that since the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter future violations of the 
Fourth Amendment by law enforcement officers, the “evidence obtained from a search 
should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had [or should 
have had] knowledge . . . that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth 
Amendment.”  Id. at 559.  The Court responded by stating that this argument renders the 
retroactivity test the government proposes absurd, because the only “Fourth Amendment 
rulings worthy of retroactive application [would be] those in which the arresting officers 
violated pre-existing guidelines clearly established by prior cases.”  Id. at 560.  The Court 
noted that cases dealing with violations of pre-existing Fourth Amendment rules do not raise 
questions of retroactivity.  Id.  Therefore, the government’s argument would “automatically 
eliminate all Fourth Amendment rulings from consideration for retroactive application.”  Id.  
 167. Gonzalez, 578 F.3d at 1131, 1132.  This very fear was one of the reasons the for the 
Court’s decision in Johnson.  See supra note 166 and accompanying text.  
 168. Gonzalez, 578 F.3d at 1132.  In Johnson, the Supreme Court created the 
retroactivity rule in an effort to prevent this very outcome.  457 U.S. at 546. 
 169. Gonzalez, 578 F.3d at 1132–33.  
 170. Gonzalez, 578 F.3d at 1132–33.  At least one federal district court has reached the 
same conclusion as the Ninth Circuit.  United States v. Buford, 623 F. Supp. 2d 923, 927 
(M.D. Tenn. 2009).  In Buford, the court’s decision turned on the inconsistent outcomes that 
would result for similarly situated defendants if the good-faith exception were expanded.  
Id. at 926–27 (citing Griffith, 479 U.S. at 323).  The court cautiously noted that the 
“Supreme Court has not indicated that the good faith exception should be extended into the 
realm of Supreme Court jurisprudence . . . [which is generally] protected by the retroactivity 
doctrine,” and granted the defendant’s motion to suppress.  Id. at 926 (internal quotations 
omitted).  
 171. See United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1044 n.5 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. 
denied, 130 S. Ct. 1686 (2010) (rejecting the retroactivity argument, and finding that the law 
created by Gant applies, but that it is a separate question from what remedy, if any, the 
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Part III will demonstrate, not only does the framework for the good-faith 
exception operate in favor of its expansion to include a law enforcement 
officer’s reasonable reliance on settled precedent, the argument that 
retroactivity requires the suppression of evidence is lacking.
172
  Therefore, 
courts should continue to follow the rationale of the good-faith doctrine and 
apply the exception to an officer’s reasonable reliance on settled case law 
that is later overturned. 
III. THE GOOD-FAITH EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE SHOULD 
BE INTERPRETED TO INCLUDE A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER’S 
OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE RELIANCE ON WELL-SETTLED PRECEDENT 
THAT IS LATER OVERRULED 
In its current form, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule 
renders suppression inappropriate when an officer acts in reasonable 
reliance on a facially valid search warrant,
173
 on a state statute that is 
subsequently invalidated,
174
 or on the negligent  
clerical errors of judicial
175
 or executive branch actors.
176
  Although the 
rationale supporting these decisions is equally applicable to a police 
officer’s reasonable reliance on judicial precedent that is later overruled, 
some argue that the good-faith exception should not be interpreted so 
expansively.
177
  This section will respond to those arguments. 
                                                                                                                 
courts are required to apply); accord United States v. Peoples,  
668 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1047 (W.D. Mich. 2009) (ruling that the retroactivity rules do not 
preclude consideration of the good-faith doctrine); see also United States v. Gray, No. 
4:09CR3089, 2009 WL 4739740, at *5–6 (D. Neb. Dec. 7, 2009) (agreeing with the Tenth 
Circuit’s ruling that the retroactivity doctrine does not preclude arguments regarding 
application of the good-faith exception). 
 172. See infra Part III. 
 173. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913–14 (1984). 
 174. See Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 352 (1987) (noting that applying the 
exclusionary rule to evidence seized in reliance on an unconstitutional state statute would 
not serve as an additional deterrent). 
 175. See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1995) (creating an exception to the 
exclusionary rule for clerical errors of court employees).  
 176. See Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 704 (2009) (holding that police 
negligence does not trigger the exclusion of evidence). 
 177. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 598 F.3d 1259, 1266–67 (11th Cir. 2010) 
(reviewing the rationale of the good-faith exception and applying it to reasonable law 
enforcement reliance on settled precedent later deemed unconstitutional). 
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A. The Leon Framework Supports an Expansion of the Good-Faith 
Exception 
1. The exclusionary rule is an inappropriate remedy because it cannot 
deter future violations of the Constitution 
Including a police officer’s reasonable reliance on settled case law in the 
good-faith exception fits within the framework created by Leon.
178
  Under 
Leon and its progeny, trial courts are required to employ a balancing test 
that weighs the costs and benefits of exclusion before suppressing 
evidence.
179
  When conducting this analysis, courts must determine whether 
excluding the evidence at trial will deter the actors responsible for the 
constitutional violation from committing future infractions.
180
  The 
Supreme Court has consistently held that when this goal is not met, 
application of the exclusionary rule is unwarranted.
181
 
Where police officers rely on the settled case law of an appellate court 
that is subsequently invalidated, the exclusionary rule does not achieve its 
desired ends of deterring future constitutional violations.
182
  This 
conclusion weighs in favor of an inclusive interpretation of the good-faith 
exception.
183
  One prominent commentator, however, argues that the good-
faith exception should not abrogate the exclusionary rule in cases where 
police reasonably relied on settled case law, asserting that the exclusion of 
such evidence would deter appellate judges from authorizing constitutional 
violations in future rulings.
184
  This argument turns on dicta from Danforth 
v. Minnesota,
185
 which explained that when the Supreme Court announces a 
new constitutional rule of criminal procedure, that rule pre-exists the 
Court’s decision in dormancy.
186
  Therefore, whenever an appellate court 
                                                 
 178. See supra Part I.A (detailing the contours of the Leon framework). 
 179. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906–07 (1984). 
 180. See id. at 916 (employing a three step syllogism to reach the conclusion that the 
exclusionary rule would not deter magistrates from authorizing future violations of the 
Constitution). 
 181. See, e.g., Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702 (“To trigger the exclusionary rule, police 
conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully  
deter it . . . .”).  
 182. See United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1045 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 
130 S. Ct. 1686 (2010) (declining to apply the exclusionary rule where officers act in 
objectively reasonable reliance on settled circuit case law).  
 183. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 598 F.3d 1259, 1265–66 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding 
support for its holding that the good-faith exception applies to reliance on settled case law 
later invalidated because the exclusionary rule is an inappropriate remedy for deterring 
judicial actors); McCane, 573 F.3d at 1044 (highlighting the inability of the exclusionary 
rule to deter judicial actors). 
 184. Posting of Orin Kerr to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/ 2010/03/08/the-
good-faith-exception-and-changing-law-distinguishing-illinois-v-krull/ (Mar. 8, 2010, 21:03 
EST). 
 185. 552 U.S. 264 (2008). 
 186. Id. at 271. 
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authorizes a holding contrary to that latent rule, the court actually 
contravenes the Constitution.
187
  This argument, though nuanced, is at odds 
with the Court’s prevailing conception of the exclusionary rule.
188
 
The exclusionary rule is intended to deter future violations of  
the Constitution committed by law enforcement authorities.
189
  As 
interested parties to individual criminal prosecutions, the exclusionary rule 
prevents police from committing these violations by sending a clear 
message that their course of action did not comply with the law.
190
  One of 
the enduring principles of the good-faith exception cases, however, is that 
the exclusionary rule was never intended to deter judicial conduct.
191
  
Judicial actors are neutral parties with no individual stake in the outcome of 
particular criminal prosecutions.
192
  Therefore, excluding evidence at trial 
obtained by a police officer acting in reasonable reliance on the decisions 
of these actors cannot legitimately be expected to deter them from 
authorizing future violations of the Constitution.
193
 
Furthermore, Herring reads a scienter requirement into the conduct that 
triggers operation of the exclusionary rule.
194
  Chief Justice Roberts noted 
that only when police misconduct is deliberate, reckless, or grossly 
negligent can the exclusionary rule act as an effective deterrent.
195
  The 
argument that exclusion would deter judges from authorizing future 
constitutional violations necessarily assumes that judges deliberately or 
recklessly reach their unconstitutional conclusions.
196
  Yet, there exists “no 
                                                 
 187. See Posting of Orin Kerr, supra note 184 (“When the Supreme Court announces 
that the circuit courts have been getting the law wrong for a few decades, that means . . . the 
lower courts were consistently and repeatedly authorizing constitutional violations.”).  This 
argument also supports the contention that the constitutional error lies with the court that 
passed down a judgment that is later overruled, rather than the police officer who relied on 
the defective ruling.  
 188. See Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 700–01 (2009) (reviewing the Court’s 
jurisprudence regarding the exclusionary rule and emphasizing that the rule does not deter 
judicial actors).  
 189. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 (1984).  
 190. Cf. Harry M. Caldwell & Carol A. Chase, The Unruly Exclusionary Rule:  Heeding 
Justice Blackmun’s Call to Examine the Rule in Light of Changing Judicial Understanding 
About Its Effects Outside the Courtroom, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 45, 54 (1994) (explaining that 
the exclusionary rule can only influence police behavior if the police are aware that the 
evidence was suppressed and the reasons for doing so).  
 191. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 916 n.15 (“[The exclusionary rule is] not well tailored to 
deterring judicial misconduct.” (quoting Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 441 N.E.2d 725, 735 
(1982))).  
 192. United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1045 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 
S. Ct. 1686 (2010). 
 193. Leon, 468 U.S. at 917. 
 194. Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 702 (2009). 
 195. Id.  The Court looks at the officer’s conduct objectively to determine whether it was 
sufficiently deliberate or reckless to warrant application of the exclusionary rule.  Id. at 703. 
 196. See supra notes 100–103 and accompanying text (demonstrating that the 
exclusionary rule, in part, aims to deter police misconduct); cf. United States v. Allison, 637 
F. Supp. 2d 657, 673 n.8 (S.D. Iowa 2009) (quoting Illinois v. Krull,  
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evidence” to suggest that judicial actors are inclined to subvert the Fourth 
Amendment or the rule of law.
197
  Of course, courts can render erroneous 
judgments, but the appropriate way to inform these courts of their mistakes 
and to deter them from authorizing future violations of the law is by 
reversing their decisions on review, not by suppressing evidence obtained 
in reliance on their judgments at trial.
198
  The Supreme Court has 
consistently emphasized that the rule’s applicability is limited to those 
areas where its “remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously 
served.”
199
  But, without culpable conduct on the part of the judiciary, the 
exclusionary rule cannot serve its deterrent purpose.
200
  Consequently, 
application of the exclusionary rule to judicial conduct is inappropriate.
201
 
Additionally, the police do not commit a culpable act capable of being 
deterred by the exclusionary rule when they reasonably rely on the settled 
precedent of an appellate court that is later overturned.
202
  The duty of the 
judiciary is to interpret the Constitution and various statutes to determine 
what the law is.
203
  When an appellate court issues an apparently valid 
ruling on a question of law, that  
decision generally obligates police to comply with it.
204
  By adhering to 
that court’s decision, the police commit no deliberate or  
reckless constitutional violation.
205
  Instead, they engage in objectively 
                                                                                                                 
480 U.S. 340, 355 (1987)) (reading the Supreme Court’s decisions in Leon and Krull to find 
that exclusion might be justified in a case where a judge “wholly abandoned” his or her 
judicial role because an officer’s reliance on that particular decision may not be reasonable).  
This caveat to the good-faith exception, however, appears to have more value in theory than 
in practice. 
 197. Leon, 468 U.S. at 916. 
 198. Cf. id. at 918 n.18 (explaining that closer judicial supervision of magistrates 
“provides a more effective remedy than the exclusionary rule”).  
 199. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 11 (1995) (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 908).    
 200. See Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702 (claiming that conduct must be sufficiently 
blameworthy before suppression could significantly deter it). 
 201. Leon, 468 U.S. at 908. 
 202. See United States v. Davis, 598 F.3d 1259, 1266 (11th Cir. 2010) (asserting that the 
exclusionary rule cannot meaningfully deter police officers from relying on the well-settled 
and unambiguous precedent of the appellate court).   
 203. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to [s]ay what the law is.”). 
 204. Cf. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1987) (noting that police officers have 
the responsibility to enforce statutes as they are written).  If this were not the case, there 
would be no need for the exclusionary rule in the first place because the primary purpose of 
the exclusionary rule is to deter future violations of the Fourth Amendment by law 
enforcement officers.  Id. at 347.  Moreover, police are invested with a significant amount of 
discretion when making decisions on whether to  
arrest or detain an individual.  ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE:  THE POWER OF THE 
AMERICAN PROSECUTOR, 6 (2007).  The obligation to act in accordance with the law arises 
when the police officers take such action, not when they employ their discretion and refrain 
from acting.  See infra note 235 and accompanying text (explaining the court’s assertion in 
Davis that a police officer’s reliance on an ambiguous rule is dangerous).  
 205. See Davis, 598 F.3d at 1265–66 (declaring that police actions that comport with a 
reviewing court’s mistaken interpretation of law cannot be considered culpable conduct 
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reasonable activity that the good-faith exception was designed to protect.
206
  
The constitutional error that arises when the case is later invalidated rests 
solely with the court that promulgated the erroneous decision, not with the 
police officer who reasonably relied upon it.
207
  To hold a blameless law 
enforcement officer accountable for the mistakes of the judiciary does not 
further the intent of the exclusionary rule, further indicating that its 
operation is unjustified.
208
 
Moreover, the benefits of deterrence do not outweigh the costs 
associated with the suppression of evidence when a police officer 
reasonably relies on established precedent that is subsequently overruled.
209
  
As described above, the particular circumstances of this situation 
undermine the deterrence rationale of the exclusionary rule; however, the 
costs associated with suppression remain.
210
  One of the early justifications 
of the exclusionary rule was that it would preserve judicial integrity by 
refusing to allow courts to sanction unlawful government behavior.
211
  By 
contrast, a rule that would reject application of the good-faith exception in 
this context would serve to punish the government even though it did not 
commit a culpable act.
212
  Instead of maintaining the public’s faith in the 
                                                                                                                 
because police officers are entitled to rely on appellate court precedent).   
 206. Id. at 1265; United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1045 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. 
denied, 130 S. Ct. 1686 (2010) (stating that an officer’s reliance on settled case law 
“certainly qualifies as objectively reasonable law enforcement behavior”).   
 207. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 921 (1984) (declaring that suppressing 
evidence obtained by an officer acting in reliance on a judicial officer’s determination of 
probable cause would penalize the police officer for mistakes attributable only to the 
judicial actor issuing the warrant); see also Davis, 598 F.3d at 1267 (explaining that when a 
court hands down a judgment that is later invalidated, it is the court promulgating that 
decision that makes the mistake of law, not the police who reasonably relied on it); McCane, 
573 F.3d at 1044 (contending that police officers commit no misconduct when they rely on 
the settled case law of a jurisdiction that is subsequently invalidated to effectuate a search). 
 208. See McCane, 573 F.3d at 1044–45 n.5 (“The lack of deterrence likely to result from 
excluding evidence from searches done in good-faith reliance upon settled circuit precedent 
indicates the good-faith exception should apply in this context.”).  Suppressing evidence that 
is obtained through objectively reasonable law enforcement conduct cannot be expected to 
deter future violations.  Id. at 1042. 
 209. E.g., United States v. Gray, No. 4:09CR3089, 2009 WL 4739740, at *6–7  
(D. Neb. Dec. 7, 2009) (explaining the cost-benefit rationale of the exclusionary rule and 
holding that the good-faith exception applies to an officer’s reasonable reliance on 
subsequently nullified case law). 
 210. See supra Part III.A.1 (arguing that the rationale of the exclusionary rule does not 
support its application in the context of police officer reliance on subsequently abrogated 
precedent).  One example of a cost associated with suppression is the interference with the 
courts’ truth-finding function. Leon, 468 U.S. at 907–08.   
 211. See Wesley MacNeil Oliver, Toward a Better Categorical Balance of the Costs and 
Benefits of the Exclusionary Rule, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 201, 211 (2005) (explaining that 
the Warren Court’s understanding of the exclusionary rule was informed, in part, by its fear 
that admitting illegally obtained evidence would undermine the integrity of the courts).  This 
rationale was largely renounced by the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. 
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974), which focused almost exclusively on the deterrent 
effect of exclusion.  Oliver, supra, at 212. 
 212. See supra notes 202–208 and accompanying text.  It is unreasonable to expect the 
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courts, suppression would jeopardize the integrity of the criminal justice 
system by allowing otherwise guilty defendants go free without securing 
any benefit in return.
213
  Courts should avoid such a deleterious result by 
reading the good-faith exception to include a law enforcement officer’s 
objectively reasonable reliance on settled case law that is later reversed. 
Here, not only do the costs of suppression outweigh the benefits of 
deterrence, but the deterrent effects that support the application of the 
exclusionary rule are entirely absent.
214
  If a court were to hold that the 
exclusionary rule applied in this situation, it would do so in opposition to 
clear and long-standing Supreme Court precedent regarding the function 
and operation of the exclusionary rule.
215
  Therefore, lower courts should 
follow this precedent and permit an expanded interpretation of the good-
faith exception. 
2. Defining the scope of the expanded good-faith exception 
As described above, the rationale supporting the exclusionary rule 
supports a broad interpretation of the good-faith exception; however, this 
should not be understood to include all reliance on case law promulgated 
within a particular jurisdiction.
216
  In order for the good-faith doctrine to 
preclude the exclusion of evidence at trial,  
law enforcement reliance must be objectively reasonable.
217
  Consistent 
with the Supreme Court’s rulings in Leon and beyond, certain limits must 
be placed on the applicability of the good-faith exception, thus allowing 
operation of the exclusionary rule when its benefits outweigh its costs.
218
 
There are at least three situations where exclusion would remain a viable 
remedy.  First, the government may not invoke the good-faith doctrine to 
admit evidence obtained from a police officer’s reliance on a judicial 
                                                                                                                 
police to question or ignore the apparently valid constitutional decisions of a court for doing 
so may, in itself, violate the Constitution.  See H. Jefferson Powell, The President’s 
Authority Over Foreign Affairs:  An Executive Branch Perspective, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
527, 532 (1999) (arguing that the executive branch is constitutionally obligated to act in 
accordance with the limits imposed upon it by Supreme Court decisions). 
 213. See Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 701 (2009) (denouncing the fact that 
the exclusionary rule “let[s] guilty and possibly dangerous defendants go free”). 
 214. See supra Part III.A.1 (arguing that the exclusionary rule cannot deter future 
constitutional violations). 
 215. See generally Leon, 468 U.S. at 905–08, 916–18, 922–25 (recounting the history 
and purpose of the exclusionary rule and developing the foundation of the good-faith 
exception). 
 216. Cf. id. at 914–15 (prohibiting application of the good-faith exception in situations 
where an officer’s reliance on a warrant could not be deemed to have been objectively 
reasonable). 
 217. Id. at 922 (emphasizing that an officer’s reliance on a facially valid warrant “must 
be objectively reasonable”). 
 218. See supra note 106 (discussing the manner in which Leon and Krull limited the 
scope of the good-faith exception). 
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decision that is patently unconstitutional.
219
  In these situations, police 
officers cannot be said to have been reasonable in their reliance on the 
rulings because the officers knew or should have known that the ruling was 
invalid.
220
  Second, and more importantly, the good-faith exception should 
only be extended to include an officer’s reasonable reliance on an appellate 
court’s well-settled decisions that constitute mandatory authority.
221
  If a 
court’s decision has not been finalized, or the state of law remains in flux, 
reliance on its conclusions may be unreasonable.
222
  Finally, a police 
officer’s reliance must be on a decision that is unequivocal.
223
  When a 
court promulgates a clear and well-defined rule, a police officer’s reliance 
upon it would be equivalent to relying on a statute that is subsequently 
declared unconstitutional.
224
  If the rule is ambiguous or undefined, a police 
officer’s reliance upon it may be unreasonable.
225
  The good-faith exception 
was designed, in part, to allow law enforcement officers to act “without 
                                                 
 219. See United States v. Allison, 637 F. Supp. 2d 657, 672 n.8 (S.D. Iowa 2009) (“A 
law enforcement officer cannot be said to have relied in good faith upon case law which 
abandons adherence to precedent and/or the applicable text such that it reaches a result ‘that 
a reasonable officer should have known was unconstitutional.’” (quoting Illinois v. Krull, 
480 U.S. 340, 355 (1987))); cf. Krull, 480 U.S. at 355 (prohibiting the application of the 
good-faith exception where an officer relies on a state statute that a “reasonable officer 
should have known . . . was unconstitutional”).  It is difficult to imagine a situation where a 
court would enter a judgment  
that obviously violates the Constitution.  Cf. Krull, 480 U.S. at 369 (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (doubting the authenticity of the Court’s exception to the good-faith exception 
for situations where a legislature “wholly abandon[s] its obligation to pass constitutional 
laws”).  In reality, there is no evidence to suggest that federal appellate judges are likely to 
disregard the Constitution.  Leon, 468 U.S. at 916.  But, the importance of the exception lies 
in the fact that it provides reviewing courts the opportunity to suppress evidence in cases of 
extreme judicial abuse without simultaneously reducing the scope of the good-faith doctrine.   
 220. See Krull, 480 U.S. at 355 (explaining that a state statute that is per se 
unconstitutional cannot be reasonably relied upon because police officers should have 
known that it was invalid).  When Leon established the good-faith doctrine, it required 
reliance to be objectively reasonable.  468 U.S. at 919 n.20.  By creating this standard, the 
Leon court intimated that any time an analysis is conducted regarding an officer’s 
reasonableness, the court “must charge the officer with a certain minimum level of 
knowledge of the law’s requirements.”  United States v. Savoca, 761 F.2d 292, 295 (6th Cir. 
1985).   
 221. See United States v. Davis, 598 F.3d 1259, 1267 (11th Cir. 2010) (indicating that 
the exclusionary rule remains a valid remedy when police rely on novel case law, because 
doing so requires an interested officer to engage in the type of legal analysis that is reserved 
for neutral judicial officers). 
 222. See id. at 1266 (asserting that the good-faith exception applies to reasonable 
reliance on “well-settled” case law).  For example, the good-faith doctrine might not apply 
when a police officer relies on the dictates of a trial court addressing a novel question of law 
that has not been thoroughly vetted on appeal.  In this situation, the law would not be well-
settled, therefore an officer’s reliance on it would be unreasonable for the purposes of the 
good-faith exception. 
 223. See id. (“[O]ur precedent on a given point must be unequivocal before we will 
suspend the exclusionary rule’s operation.”). 
 224. Id. at 1267–68 (citing Krull, 480 U.S. at 340). 
 225. See id. at 1266–67 (explaining that the clarity of the rule is necessary to the good-
faith analysis because without it, police officers might have the incentive to rely on the 
unsettled nature of a Fourth Amendment question to the detriment of the Constitution). 
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having to engage in the interpretive activities generally reserved to the 
courts.”
226
  For police to rely on an ambiguous rule, however, they might 
have to undertake a level of legal analysis that the good-faith exception 
explicitly attempts to eliminate.
227
 
These exceptions to the operation of the good-faith doctrine not only 
comport with Supreme Court precedent, but they also provide strong 
incentives for police officers to follow the law.
228
  In United States v. 
Peoples,
229
 a federal district court refused to expand the good-faith 
exception to include reasonable reliance on settled case law.
230
  The court’s 
holding was based upon the concern that expanding the good-faith 
exception would allow a police officer to make a unilateral determination 
as to whether his or her actions were in compliance with the Constitution 
when conducting a search or seizure.
231
  The court feared that extending the 
exception would allow police to conduct illegal searches so long as they 
were able to cite a case from which they could reasonably conclude that 
their actions were justified.
232
  The court found that this result would soon 
render the exclusionary rule defunct because the exception would apply 
“whenever an officer could establish good-faith on most any basis.”
233
 
The opinion in Peoples voiced serious concerns about an expanded view 
of the good-faith exception.
234
  Its criticism, however, is excessive.  A 
good-faith doctrine that includes reasonable reliance on the well-settled and 
unequivocal decisions of an appellate court will create an incentive for 
police to follow that court’s dictates rather than engage in the troublesome 
                                                 
 226. United States v. Peoples, 668 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1049 (W.D. Mich. 2009). 
 227. Id.; see Davis, 598 F.3d at 1267 (emphasizing that an analysis of the ambiguity of a 
rule promulgated by an appellate court is essential to the determination of whether the 
officer satisfied the reasonableness requirement of the good-faith exception). 
 228. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922–23 (1984) (preventing the 
extension of the good-faith exception to situations where reliance is unreasonable, including 
when a police officer claims to rely on a warrant that is facially deficient). 
 229. 668 F. Supp. 2d 1042 (W.D. Mich. 2009). 
 230. Id. at 1050–51.  The court looked to the Seventh Circuit, which had previously been 
confronted with the question of whether the good-faith exception included an officer’s 
reliance on precedent later overturned by the Supreme Court.  United States v. 15324 Cnty 
Highway E., 332 F.3d 1070, 1074 (7th Cir. 2003).  The court declined to extend the 
exception, reasoning that such an expansion would have “undesirable [and] unintended 
consequences.”  Id. at 1076.  Although the court did not extensively elaborate on this 
conclusion, the opinion noted that a contrary ruling would encourage law enforcement 
officers to engage in activities, such as legal analysis and research, that are better left to 
members of the judiciary.  Id.  Citing this vague language, the federal district court in 
Peoples attempted to clarify the purported consequences of expanding the good-faith 
exception to include reasonable reliance on judicial precedent.  668 F. Supp. 2d. at 1047–50.   
 231. Peoples, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 1049. 
 232. Id. at 1050. 
 233. Id.  
 234. Id. at 1047–48. 
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types of legal analysis as described in Peoples.
235
  It will also encourage 
police officers to adhere to the rule of law. 
Under an inclusive good-faith doctrine, when police officers follow the 
unambiguous and firmly-rooted decision of an appellate court, they gain 
the benefit of having any evidence obtained in reliance on that decision 
admitted at trial, even if that case is later reversed.
236
  Because police 
officers are concerned with the outcome of individual criminal 
prosecutions, they have an interest in seeing incriminating evidence 
admitted at trial.
237
  This negates any impulse that police may have to rely 
on their own conceptions of the law to inform their actions.  If the 
government can demonstrate that the officer’s reliance was objectively 
reasonable, then the evidence will be admitted.
238
  On the other hand, if the 
police decide to stray from established precedent and undertake actions 
based on their own view of the law, a trial judge analyzing the good-faith 
exception is more likely to exclude any improperly obtained evidence.
239
  
The judge is likely to exclude the evidence because the good-faith 
exception does not include a police officer’s unilateral mistake of law.
240
 
                                                 
 235. See United States v. Davis, 598 F.3d 1259 at 1266–67 (11th Cir. 2010) (asserting 
that a police officer’s mistake of law is not objectively reasonable, and thus does not fit 
within the good-faith exception).  When police officers rely on a case that is subsequently 
overturned, the mistake is attributable to the court, not to the police officers acting in 
reliance on a court’s decision.  Id. at 1267–68. 
 236. See, e.g., United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1045 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. 
denied, 130 S. Ct. 1686 (2010) (affirming the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress 
evidence obtained by a police officer who reasonably relied on pre-Gant precedent).  Even 
where precedent has not been thoroughly vetted, an expanded good-faith exception provides 
law enforcement with an incentive to adhere to the law.  In this situation, the potential 
benefit that accompanies reliance outweighs the risk associated with a police officer’s 
decision to ignore or individually interpret its requirements.  Trial courts bound by the 
newly announced appellate decision are likely to find that a police officer’s adherence to its 
dictates is reasonable.  Of course, the defense would be able to argue the contrary position, 
but this is ultimately a question for the courts to decide given the particular circumstances 
surrounding the police officer’s actions.  It is clear, however, that an officer who, because of 
the  
law’s relative temporal disposition, departs from its commands or attaches an unreasonable 
interpretation to it runs a higher risk of mistake, thus nullifying the operation of the good-
faith exception.  See supra note 235 and accompanying text (explaining that an expanded 
good-faith exception would discourage police from relying on their own interpretation of 
law). 
 237. Cf. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 240 (1983) (explaining that a judicial 
determination of probable cause is preferred to the judgment of a police officer “engaged in 
the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime” (quoting Johnson v. United States, 
333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948))). 
 238. See Davis, 598 F.3d at 1267–68 (declining to suppress evidence obtained by a 
police officer’s objectively reasonable reliance on established precedent).  
 239. See supra notes 222, 235 (finding that a court would be more likely to exclude 
evidence if an officer relies on law that is not well-settled or if the officer relies on his or her 
own biased conception of the law). 
 240. See supra note 235 (excluding an officer’s mistake of law because it is not 
objectively reasonable). 
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Paradoxically, the court’s holding in Peoples may foster the very 
behavior that it attempts to prohibit.
241
  Rather than barring the police from 
interjecting their biased interpretations of the law in an attempt to justify 
their actions, the holding in Peoples encourages it.
242
  The Peoples decision 
communicates the message that police cannot trust judicial precedent to 
instruct them on how to comply with the law.  Without this assurance, 
police will naturally question the disposition of every decision announced 
by the courts within their jurisdiction.
243
  In so doing, they may interpose 
their own self-interested understanding of what the Constitution permits 
them to do.
244
  Instead of creating an incentive for police “to err on the side 
of constitutional behavior,” this rule encourages police to develop their 
own interpretations of the law beyond what the courts dictate.
245
  But, 
police are not in a position to determine independently what the law 
requires, nor are they able to foresee any potential change in the law that 
would justify their disregard of settled precedent.
246
  A rule that provokes 
police to rely on their own perception of the law invites constitutional 
violations, and that is a danger courts must avoid.
247
 
Throughout the development of the good-faith exception, the Supreme 
Court has restricted the scope of the exception to law enforcement conduct 
that is objectively reasonable.
248
  Limiting a police officer’s reasonable 
reliance on case law to the well-settled and unambiguous decisions of an 
appellate court of that jurisdiction complies with this general 
requirement.
249
  This formulation of the good-faith exception refrains from 
swallowing the exclusionary rule by providing defendants the opportunity 
to litigate the question of whether an officer’s reliance was objectively 
reasonable.
250
  It also discourages police from engaging in potentially 
                                                 
 241. Cf. United States v. Peoples, 668 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1050 (W.D. Mich. 2009) 
(“Extending Leon good-faith to include reliance on court precedent . . . involves an 
interpretive step on the part of the police that is totally absent from and unjustified by any 
previous Supreme Court application of a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule”).   
 242. Cf. id. (arguing that “[e]xtending the good-faith exception to cover an officer’s 
good-faith interpretation of case law would in short order become functionally 
indistinguishable from an exception that applied whenever an officer could establish good 
faith on most any basis”). 
 243. United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 561 (1982). 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Cf. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 921 (1984) (concluding that a police 
officer “cannot be expected to question the magistrate’s probable-cause determination”); 
United States v. Savoca, 761 F.2d 292, 295 (6th Cir. 1985) (noting that the officer must be 
provided with knowledge of the law’s requirements).    
 247. Johnson, 457 U.S. at 561.  
 248. See supra note 220 and accompanying text (noting that the objectively reasonable 
standard assumes the officer has some minimum level of knowledge of the law’s 
requirements). 
 249. See supra notes 205–206 and accompanying text (listing examples of cases holding 
that an officer’s reliance on well-settled case law is objectively reasonable). 
 250. Contra United States v. Peoples, 668 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1050 (W.D. Mich. 2009) 
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abusive behavior because this formulation of the good-faith exception 
motivates them to comply with the law as announced by the courts of 
review within their jurisdiction.
251
  When these benefits provided by the 
good-faith exception are combined with the substantial costs associated 
with exclusion of evidence at trial, it is clear that the rationale underlying 
the Supreme Court’s good-faith exception supports an expanded 
interpretation of that doctrine.
252
 
B. The Supreme Court’s Retroactivity Doctrine Does %ot Preclude 
Application of the Good-Faith Exception to a Police Officer’s Reasonable 
Reliance on the Established Precedent of an Appellate Court that is 
Subsequently Overturned 
The strongest opposition to the expanded good-faith exception comes 
from courts that have interpreted the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment 
retroactivity doctrine to prohibit such an expansion.
253
  The Supreme Court 
laid out this doctrine in United States v. Johnson
254
 and Griffith v. 
Kentucky.
255
  In these decisions, the Court concluded that it must apply all 
new rules of constitutional criminal procedure to each case pending direct 
                                                                                                                 
(arguing that police officers would inevitably be able to find a case on which they could 
claim they reasonably relied, rendering the exclusionary rule null).   
 251. See supra notes 236–237 and accompanying text (arguing that officers will follow 
settled case law because they have an interest in seeing incriminating evidence admitted at 
trial and relying on case law makes admission more likely). 
 252. See supra Part III.A.1 (arguing that suppressing evidence obtained by police 
officers acting in reasonable reliance on well-settled case law that is later reversed fails the 
cost-benefit analysis required by Leon because it does not advance the deterrent purpose of 
the exclusionary rule). 
 253. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.  This section assumes that Gant created 
a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure capable of being given retroactive effect.  
One could argue that Gant merely clarified the rationale of Belton instead of promulgating a 
new rule that could be applied retroactively.  See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1726 
(2009) (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority opinion refused to explicitly overrule 
Belton).  But, there is no clear authority that suggests this is the appropriate analysis.  
 254. 457 U.S. 537, 547–49 (1982) (applying a balancing test to hold that new rules of 
criminal procedure apply to cases pending on direct review unless they are a clear break 
from past decisions). 
 255. 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987) (employing a bright-line rule that all new rules of 
criminal procedure regarding the Fourth Amendment apply to cases pending on direct 
review, regardless of whether they represent a clear break from  
past precedent).  It is important to note that there is a key distinction between Johnson and 
Griffith.  United States v. Gonzalez (Gonzalez II), 598 F.3d 1095, 1108–09 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(Bea, J., dissenting), denying reh’g, 578 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2009).  Johnson dealt with the 
retroactive effect of Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Fourth Amendment.  Id.  
Griffith, on the other hand, dealt with the retroactive effect of the Court’s decision in Batson 
v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), which addressed a question of law under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Gonzales, 598 F.3d at 1109 (Bea, J., dissenting).  The rights given retroactive 
effect under these decisions are different as well.  Id.  The Fourteenth Amendment decision 
addressed in Griffith dealt with  
the personal rights of every criminal defendant.  Id.  The Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary 
rule, however, is not an individual right, but a “societal right” focused on influencing the 
behavior of law enforcement authorities.  Id. at 1108–09. 
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review concerning the same issue.
256
  Although this precedent is long-
settled and well-reasoned, the courts holding that this doctrine precludes 
the extension of the good-faith exception are mistaken. 
Opponents of a permissive good-faith exception argue that it would 
effectively overturn the Supreme Court’s retroactivity doctrine.
257
  To reach 
this conclusion, however, requires a strained reading of that line of cases.  
In dealing with the particular dilemma of whether to apply the good-faith 
exception to law enforcement’s reliance on pre-Gant searches, the 
retroactivity doctrine requires only that lower federal courts apply the rule 
of Fourth Amendment law elucidated in Gant.
258
  Although the United 
States Supreme Court affirmed the Arizona Supreme Court’s holding, 
which suppressed evidence obtained in violation of the newly promulgated 
rule in Gant, such an affirmation does not make the entire holding of the 
Arizona Supreme Court the law as dictated by the United States Supreme 
Court.
259
  Rather, the United States Supreme Court’s “holding is limited to 
the questions on which it granted certiorari.”
260
  The Court in Gant only 
considered whether the search of the defendant’s vehicle was a violation of 
the Fourth Amendment.
261
  Under that authority, cases pending on direct 
review enjoy the benefit of the Gant decision only to the extent that the 
searches conducted in reliance on pre-Gant precedent are now deemed 
unconstitutional.
262
  However, the lower courts must still determine 
whether exclusion is the proper remedy to apply when they are faced with 
these violations.
263
  In this situation, courts must look to the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence regarding the exclusionary rule for guidance.
264
 
The Court in Herring reaffirmed the rationale underlying  
the earlier good-faith exception cases.
265
  As outlined above, this reasoning 
                                                 
 256. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 328.  
 257. Reply Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 8, McCane v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1686 
(2010) (No. 09-402).  
 258. Accord United States v. Peoples, 668 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1045 (W.D. Mich. 2009) 
(asserting that Gant “must undoubtedly apply to all cases pending on direct review” (citing 
Griffith, 479 U.S. at 328)); see United States v. Leon 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (quoting 
Illinois v. Gates, 426 U.S. 213, 223 (1983)) (asserting that the question of whether the 
exclusionary rule is an appropriate sanction to apply in any given case is a wholly distinct 
question from whether the Fourth Amendment rights of an individual seeking to invoke the 
rule has been violated); see also United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1044–45 n.5 
(10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1686 (2010) (explaining that the Supreme Court’s 
retroactivity doctrine applies the Court’s rule from Gant to the case pending on direct 
review, but the question of remedy remains open for interpretation).   
 259. Peoples, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 1045–46. 
 260. Id. (citing SUP. CT. R. 14.1(a)).  
 261. See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1724 (2009) (affirming the Arizona Supreme 
Court’s suppression of evidence obtained in reliance on pre-Gant case law). 
 262. McCane, 573 F.3d at 1044–45 n.5. 
 263. Id. 
 264. See generally Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 699–701 (2009) (discussing 
the rationale for the application of the exclusionary rule). 
 265. Id.  
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weighs heavily in favor of extending the good-faith exception to include 
executive branch reliance on settled case law.
266
  Because this is the 
appropriate method of adjudicating cases under the Court’s retroactivity 
doctrine, those courts that have applied the good-faith exception are correct 
in doing so.
267
  Rather than operating as a barrier to analyzing the 
applicability of the exclusionary rule, the retroactivity doctrine forces 
courts to address this very question.
268
  This result leads to the conclusion 
that, under the Supreme Court’s current formulation of the exclusionary 
rule, the good-faith exception should be expanded to include an officer’s 
reasonable reliance on firmly-established appellate court precedent.
269
 
The historical connection between the Supreme Court’s retroactivity 
doctrine and its good-faith exception helps illustrate the fact that it is not 
necessary to read the two lines of authority to conflicting ends.  The 
retroactivity doctrine was developed during the same period in which the 
Supreme Court first articulated the good-faith exception.  The Court 
announced the new Fourth Amendment retroactivity doctrine in Johnson 
only two years before it handed down its good-faith exception decision in 
Leon.
270
  In Leon, the Court specifically addressed the contention that the 
good-faith  
exception was in conflict with the Court’s new retroactivity doctrine.
271
  
The Court succinctly declared that “nothing in Johnson precludes adoption 
of a good-faith exception tailored to situations in which the police have 
reasonably relied on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate 
but later found to be defective.”
272
  Similarly, the Court decided Griffith a 
mere two months before it adjudicated Krull.
273
  Justice O’Connor, in her 
dissent in Krull, even invoked Griffith, arguing that its holding was at odds 
                                                 
 266. See Part III.A (arguing that the Leon framework supports extension of the good-
faith exception to include reliance on judicial precedent). 
 267. See, e.g., McCane, 573 F.3d at 1042–45 (explaining that the rationale supporting the 
good-faith exception as described by the Supreme Court applies to police officer reliance on 
settled case law that is invalidated after the search or seizure in question occurs). 
 268. See United States v. Peoples, 668 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1046, 1048–51 (W.D. Mich. 
2009) (holding that retroactivity does not prevent consideration of the good-faith exception 
to police officer reliance on invalidated judicial precedent, and then analyzing whether the 
exclusionary rule is the appropriate remedy to apply when a violation of Gant is found). 
 269. See McCane, 573 F.3d at 1045 (holding that the good-faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule applies to law enforcement reliance on subsequently invalidated judicial 
precedent).   
 270. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984) (adopting the good-faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule on July 5, 1984); United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 
537 (1982) (creating the modern Fourth Amendment retroactivity doctrine on June 21, 
1982). 
 271. Leon, 468 U.S. at 912 n.9. 
 272. Id. 
 273. See Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 340 (1987) (expanding the good-faith exception 
on March 9, 1987 to include an officer’s reasonable reliance on a state statute that is later 
declared unconstitutional); Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987) (abrogating the 
“clear break” exception to the Supreme Court’s retroactivity doctrine on January 13, 1987).  
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with the Court’s decision in Krull.
274
  The majority ignored this argument 
and further expanded the scope of the good-faith exception.
275
  When read 
together, this history makes it clear that the retroactivity doctrine should 
not be considered a necessary impediment to the expansion of the good-
faith doctrine. 
The Ninth Circuit put forth an alternative argument in favor of using 
retroactivity to prevent an enlargement of the good-faith exception.
276
  In 
Gonzalez, the court stated that if it were to allow the defendant’s conviction 
to stand based upon evidence admitted under the good-faith exception, it 
would treat the defendant differently than a similarly situated defendant 
was treated in Gant, thus violating a norm of constitutional decision-
making.
277
  Although it is true that Justice Harlan was concerned about 
such a result in his dissent in Desist v. United States,
278
 which the court 
cited with approval in United States v. Johnson,
279
 the Ninth Circuit’s 
framing of the issue is misleading. 
Opponents of the Ninth Circuit’s decision have argued that, in fact, the 
defendants in Gant and Gonzalez were not similarly situated,
280
 and their 
conclusion is correct.  In Gant, the government never raised the argument 
that the good-faith exception applied to preclude the suppression of 
evidence at trial.
281
  Therefore, no court addressed the question of whether 
the exclusionary rule was appropriately applied by conducting the cost-
benefit analysis required by Leon and its progeny.
282
  However, before the 
Ninth Circuit, the government did invoke the good-faith exception, yet the 
court disregarded the contention by failing to conduct the necessary 
balancing test.
283
  The Ninth Circuit hastily glossed over this key 
distinction to support its conclusion that the Supreme Court’s retroactivity 
doctrine compelled suppression.
284
 
Moreover, similarly situated defendants are regularly treated differently 
when circuit splits arise.
285
  Such a result does not necessarily indicate that 
                                                 
 274. Krull, 480 U.S. at 368 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 275. Id. at 352–53 (majority opinion). 
 276. United States v. Gonzalez, 578 F.3d 1130, 1133 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 277. Id. at 1132–33. 
 278. 394 U.S. 244, 258–59 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 279. 457 U.S. 537, 547–48 (1982) (quoting Desist, 394 U.S. at 258–59 (Harlan, J., 
dissenting)). 
 280. Gonzalez II, 598 F.3d 1095, 1107 (9th Cir. 2010) (Bea, J., dissenting), denying 
reh’g, 578 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2009).  
 281. Id. 
 282. See id. 1107–08 (recounting the fact that Gant did not address questions of 
suppression and the deterrent effect it may have).  
 283. See Gonzalez, 578 F.3d at 1132 (noting that the good-faith argument was raised, but 
finding that the Supreme Court’s retroactivity precedent controlled the decision of the case). 
 284. Id. at 1132–33. 
 285. Compare United States v. Strahan, 984 F.2d 155, 159 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that 
the search incident to arrest doctrine did not apply to a recent occupant of a vehicle that was 
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the lower courts that have an expanded interpretation of the good-faith 
exception are violating the Supreme Court’s retroactivity doctrine.  Rather, 
it indicates that there is a misunderstanding as to whether the remedy 
affirmed by the Supreme Court in Gant must apply to cases pending on 
direct review.
286
  As noted above, the Supreme Court’s own rules prohibit 
such a reading of Gant.
287
  Perhaps that is why the majority of courts facing 
the issue have disagreed with the Gonzalez court’s analysis.
288
 
Another argument in favor of finding that the retroactivity doctrine 
defeats an expansion of the good-faith exception was put forth  
by Justice O’Connor in her dissent in Illinois v. Krull.
289
  Justice O’Connor 
contended that applying the good-faith exception to an officer’s reasonable 
reliance on an apparently valid state statute that is subsequently overturned 
would remove “all incentive on the part of individual criminal defendants 
to litigate the violation of their Fourth Amendment rights” because they 
would not be afforded a remedy for the constitutional violation they 
suffered.
290
  This argument essentially states that courts would be resigned 
to rendering advisory opinions if the good-faith exception were to apply, 
because although the courts find a constitutional violation, no remedy 
would be provided for the victims of such breaches.
291
  Though powerful, 
this contention has not found substantial support in binding precedent.
292
 
                                                                                                                 
thirty feet from the car at the time of the arrest), with United States v. Thornton, 325 F.3d 
189, 194, 196 (4th Cir. 2003) (disagreeing with the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Strahan and 
holding that officers may search a recent occupant’s vehicle incident to arrest).  The 
Supreme Court ultimately agreed with the Fourth Circuit’s ruling.  See Thornton v. United 
States, 541 U.S. 615, 623–24 (2004) (affirming the Fourth Circuit’s judgment and holding 
that police officers may search a recent occupant’s vehicle incident to arrest).  
 286. See United States v. Peoples, 668 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1047 (W.D. Mich. 2009) 
(disagreeing with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and finding that the Supreme Court’s 
retroactivity doctrine does not apply to prevent analysis of whether the good-faith exception 
can be extended to include law enforcement reliance on settled judicial precedent that is 
subsequently invalidated (citing Gonzalez, 578 F.3d at 1133)). 
 287. See Peoples, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 1046 (explaining that Supreme Court Rule 14.1(a) 
limited the Court’s ruling in Gant only to the question that was presented before the court 
regarding the contours of the Fourth Amendment, not the remedy the Court affirmed). 
 288. Accord United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1044–45 n.5 (10th Cir. 2009), 
cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1686 (2010); Peoples, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 1047; see, e.g., United 
States v. Davis, 598 F.3d 1259, 1263–64 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding the Ninth Circuit’s 
interpretation of the Supreme Court’s retroactivity doctrine unavailing). 
 289. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 368–69 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  
 290. Id. at 369 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 291. Reply Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 12, McCane v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1686 
(2010) (No. 09-402). 
 292. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 924 n.25 (1984) (finding the argument that 
the good-faith exception would take away the incentive for defendants to litigate valid 
Fourth Amendment claims “unpersuasive”).  When faced with a similar contention, the 
Eleventh Circuit responded rather bluntly, insisting that “the exclusionary rule is designed to 
deter misconduct, not to foster the development of Fourth Amendment law.”  United States 
v. Davis, 598 F.3d 1259, 1266 n.8 (11th Cir. 2010). 
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To begin, the Supreme Court appears to have little regard for this 
concern.
293
  In the very case in which Justice O’Connor articulated her 
apprehension, the Court chose to apply the good-faith exception over her 
dissent.
294
  Furthermore, the Court essentially ignored this argument when 
it revisited the good-faith exception in the later cases of Evans and, more 
recently, Herring.
295
  In the context of Gant violations, the Supreme Court 
had the opportunity to explain that suppression would be an appropriate 
remedy for convictions pending on direct appeal based on evidence 
obtained in violation of the new Gant precedent, but it left the question 
unaddressed.
296
  By applying the appropriate standard for exclusion and 
reaching the conclusion that the good-faith exception applies to a police 
officer’s reasonable reliance on well-settled case law that is subsequently 
reversed, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits acted in accordance with the 
rationale underlying the good-faith doctrine.
297
 
Additionally, this argument incorrectly assumes that once an appellate 
court decides a case and a police officer relies upon it to obtain evidence, 
the good-faith exception will always preclude operation of the exclusionary 
rule at trial.
298
  The Supreme Court has always required a police officer’s 
reliance, whether it is on a search warrant or state statute, to be objectively 
reasonable.
299
  In situations where the precedent has not been thoroughly 
vetted on appeal or the rule on which the police relied was ambiguous, the 
defense retains its ability to effectively argue that a police officer’s reliance 
upon the decision was unreasonable.
300
 
                                                 
 293. Leon, 468 U.S. at 924 n. 25.    
 294. Krull, 480 U.S. at 349–50.   
 295. See Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 699, 704 (2009) (accepting the 
assumption that the search of the petitioner was a violation of the Fourth Amendment, but 
affording him no remedy because the good-faith exception precluded exclusion); Arizona v. 
Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1995) (holding that although the search of the defendant violated 
the Fourth Amendment, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule prevented 
suppression of the evidence obtained from that search); Leon, 468 U.S. at 926 (holding that 
objectively reasonable reliance on a facially valid search warrant that is later deemed 
deficient operates to prevent application of the exclusionary rule).  
 296. See United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1045 n.5 (10th Cir. 2009),  
cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1686 (2010) (finding that the Supreme Court’s retroactivity 
requirements only demand application of the rule specifically declared in Gant, not the 
remedy of the lower court that the Supreme Court affirmed). 
 297. See id. at 1042–45 (analyzing the rationale of the good-faith exception and applying 
it to hold that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule includes reasonable law 
enforcement reliance on case law that is later overturned).  
 298. Cf. Gonzalez II, 598 F.3d 1095, 1106–07 (9th Cir. 2010) (Bea, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he existence of a relevant court case supporting an officer’s search does not 
automatically prove he was acting in good faith where that case is later overruled.  A police 
officer must still prove that his reliance was objectively reasonable.”) denying reh’g, 578 
F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 299. Id. at 1107. 
 300. See id. at 1106–07 (noting that the good-faith exception is not applied 
automatically).   
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Furthermore, this argument goes so far as to assume that even in novel 
cases, criminal defendants and their attorneys will have the foresight to 
predict with certainty the outcome of their particular case before the trial 
and appellate courts, therefore dissuading them from pursuing their 
constitutional claims.  But, this cannot be the rational approach.  Due 
process requires that for each novel issue a court hears, it must do so with 
the possibility of finding in favor of the defendant.
301
  A criminal defendant 
brought to trial would be far more rational in pursuing a vindication of her 
Fourth Amendment rights before that body than failing to raise the issue, 
thus precluding any possibility of a beneficial outcome before that 
tribunal.
302
  Should such a claim fail, the rational defendant would opt to 
pursue review of the losing claim before an appellate court rather than 
squander such an opportunity by resigning herself to defeat at the trial 
level.  Because there is always a chance that the higher courts may side 
with the defendant on a novel claim, the incentive to litigate Fourth 
Amendment violations remains intact.
303
  Therefore, the concerns about the 
good-faith exception destroying any possibility that a defendant will retain 
the benefit of the exclusionary rule in the context of an officer’s reasonable 
reliance on case law are unwarranted. 
Although critics of the expanded good-faith exception rely, primarily, on 
the Supreme Court’s retroactivity doctrine, this approach ignores the 
importance of the Court’s equally long-standing good-faith doctrine.
304
  So 
long as the exclusionary rule is understood to operate only as a last resort to 
deter future violations of the Fourth Amendment,
305
 admitting evidence 
obtained in good-faith reliance on settled case law that is subsequently 
invalidated is justified.  If courts were to suppress such evidence, they 
would do so to the detriment of both society and the criminal justice 
system.
306
  Those who argue that admitting the evidence would violate 
                                                 
 301. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2259 (2009) (“It is 
axiomatic that ‘[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.’” 
(quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955))). 
 302. Cf. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 354 (1987) (explaining that “‘the magnitude of 
the benefit conferred on defendants by a successful [suppression] motion makes it unlikely 
that litigation of colorable claims will be substantially diminished’” (quoting United States 
v. Leon, 468 U.S 897, 924 n.25 (1984))).  
 303. See supra note 295 (noting that due process requires a fair tribunal). 
 304. See People v. Branner, 103 Cal. Rptr. 3d 256, 267 (Ct. App. 2009) (noting that the 
Supreme Court’s precedent regarding the good-faith exception is as important as the 
Supreme Court’s retroactivity doctrine), review granted, 227 P.3d 342 (2010). 
 305. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 700. 
 306. Cf. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984) (explaining that the costs 
associated with a dogmatic application of the exclusionary rule, such as impeding the truth-
finding functions of the courts and letting some guilty defendants go free, “have long been a 
source of concern” for the Court).  The Court also noted that when a police officer acts in 
good faith but commits a minor infraction, an inflexible approach to the exclusionary rule 
would confer a higher magnitude of benefits to an otherwise guilty defendant.  Id. at 908.  
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basic norms of constitutional adjudication overlook the fact that 
suppressing the evidence would offend basic concepts of justice underlying 
the entire judicial system’s operation.
307
 
CONCLUSION 
The costs society is forced to bear when inherently trustworthy physical 
evidence is excluded from trial are substantial.
308
  That is why application 
of the exclusionary rule is only appropriate when the benefits it provides in 
terms of deterring future constitutional violations outweigh its 
accompanying costs.
309
  When a court lets an otherwise guilty defendant go 
free, it jeopardizes the integrity of the entire judicial system.
310
  Because 
these institutions possess only as much power as society is willing to 
attribute them, anything that casts doubt on the courts’ decision-making 
processes cannot be healthy for the rule of law.
311
  That is why courts 
should work to reduce public perceptions of judicial impropriety at every 
turn.  The good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule is a rational 
response to this dilemma. 
The framework set forth in Leon clearly supports the expansion of the 
good-faith exception to include a police officer’s objectively reasonable 
reliance on a well-settled and unambiguous decision of an appellate court 
that is later reversed.
312
  As the Supreme Court declared, the exclusionary 
rule “cannot be expected, and should not be applied, to deter objectively 
reasonable law enforcement activity.”
313
  Yet, if courts were to adopt the 
exclusionary rule in this context, they would be attempting to do just that.  
When police officers conform their conduct to the law as announced by the 
courts within their jurisdiction, they are doing precisely what society 
expects of them, thus making their actions reasonable.
314
  An expanded 
                                                 
 307. Id. 
 308. See Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 700–01 (2009) (providing examples of 
the costs associated with the exclusion of incriminating evidence at trial (citing Illinois v. 
Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 352–53 (1987))).  
 309. Id. at 700. 
 310. Id. at 701 (citing Leon, 480 U.S. at 908).  
 311. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992) (“The 
Court’s power lies . . . in its legitimacy, a product of substance and perception that shows 
itself in the people’s acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation’s law 
means and to declare what it demands.”). 
 312. Cf. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10–16 (1995) (reviewing the rationale supporting 
the good-faith exception in Leon and applying it to find that the exception encompasses a 
law enforcement officer’s reasonable reliance on the negligent mistake of judicial 
employees); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347–53 (1987) (appropriating the reasoning of 
Leon to hold that a law enforcement officer’s reasonable reliance on a subsequently 
invalidated state statute precluded the application of the exclusionary rule). 
 313. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919 (1984).  
 314. See United States v. Owens, No. 5:09-cr-14/RS, 2009 WL 2584570, at *3 (“Relying 
upon settled case law is objectively reasonable law enforcement behavior.”).  
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good-faith exception recognizes this incongruity, and prevents the 
operation of the exclusionary rule when it would only work to harm 
society. 
Some courts, however, have rejected an expansion of the good-faith 
exception out of fear that it would conflict with the Supreme Court’s 
Fourth Amendment retroactivity doctrine.
315
  These courts read an 
importance into the retroactivity doctrine that ignores the fundamental 
interests served by the current formulation of the good-faith exception.
316
  
Furthermore, they misunderstand how the retroactivity doctrine operates.
317
  
Ever since the Supreme Court adopted the good-faith exception, it has 
carefully explained that questions of law must be separated from questions 
of remedy.
318
  The courts that mechanically apply remedies not specifically 
addressed in the Supreme Court’s rulings do so in error.
319
  Therefore, 
courts should continue to adopt the good-faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule in situations where a police officer reasonably relies on 
the settled case law of the jurisdiction in which the officer acts.
 
                                                 
 315. See supra Part II.B.  
 316. See supra note 304 and accompanying text. 
 317. See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
 318. See supra note 258 and accompanying text. 
 319. See United States v. Peoples, 668 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1046 (W.D. Mich. 2009) 
(explaining that the Supreme Court’s rules require only the retroactive application of the 
constitutional rule announced in Gant not the remedy that the Court affirmed).  
